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Preface
“...Let me be clear: the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]
are a pledge. They are a commitment to the worlds most vulnerable
people. Achieving the MDGs is a practical necessity. It is a moral
imperative. And it is possible.” (Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General
of the United Nations, Remarks to ”State of the Planet 2010:
Connecting Voices Globally to Meet the Challenges of Climate
Change, Poverty and Economic Recovery” New York, 25 March
2010)
These passionate words of Ban Ki-moon express both the urgency and feasibility of global
solutions to global problems – among which environmental protection needs to be counted.
Environmental sustainability is one of the eight Millennium Development Goals (see UN,
2000). And exactly for this purpose multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are
aimed at fostering world wide cooperation. MEAs are voluntary, thus preserve sovereignty
of the countries, are governed by international law, tie up diﬀerent environmental issues
more than two countries are concerned of, and symbolize a growing world wide inter-
connectedness in environmental protection which already began in the 19th century (cf.
Mitchell, 2003 and 2007).
This dissertation consists of three empirical chapters. The ﬁrst two works make use of the
dynamic linear feedback model of Blundell, Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002) to analyze
VIII
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the history of MEAs, their nexuses to trade and investment liberalization, and the mutual
relationships of MEA clusters1. In contrast to this, the third one makes a projection of
atmosphere related MEAs applying a simulation based forecasting approach in the manner
of Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) and studies the impact of these MEAs on future
CO2 emissions.
Chapter 1 composes a comprehensive picture of determinants that aﬀect multilateral en-
vironmental agreement membership. Rose and Spiegel (2009) can show that bilateral
environmental agreements can boost capital assets of the involved partners. Thus, to
cooperate on environmental issues is not an isolated action of countries protecting their
resources or limiting their emissions. Voluntarily and jointly agreeing on environmental
protection is part of an international integration process the world focuses, well-known as
globalization. The related growing interconnectedness is reﬂected in a raising number of
diﬀerent international agreements regarding trade, investments, poverty control, health,
etc. In chapter 1 we focus on a country’s international openness by means of its trade and
investment agreements and ﬁnd that richer countries and countries which are more active
in international trade and investment treaties, thus more open to world trade, are leading
in forming multilateral cooperation with respect to environmental protection. Applying
the dynamic linear feedback model of Blundell, Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002) among
others we ﬁlter out signiﬁcant inﬂuences of both trade and investment liberalization on a
country’s decision to ratify another MEA. On the basis of ONE STEP estimates we pre-
dict the eﬀect on MEAs, for example, in the presence and absence of trade liberalization.
Every country in the world would have ratiﬁed in mean 4 MEAs less (in the short run) or
5 MEAs less (in the long run) if trade liberalization through preferential trade agreements
like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) had missed.
1cf. multilateral environmental agreements clusters of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP, 2001).
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Table 1: Mutual inﬂuences of MEA clusters
Biodiversity Atmosphere Land Chemicals Seas
Biodiversity + +
Atmosphere + + + +
Land +
Chemicals + + + + +
Seas + + + + +
Chapter 2 addresses the diﬀerent environmental issues MEAs rely on. The United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP, 2001) divides multilateral environmental agreements
into ﬁve clusters with respect to their core convention: biodiversity, atmosphere, land,
chemicals and hazardous wastes, and regional seas and related agreements. The question
arises whether economic, political, and environmental determinants aﬀect these clusters
diﬀerently. Furthermore, like trade agreements and investment treaties are connected to
environmental agreements (cf. Chapter 1), do multilateral environmental agreements of
diﬀerent clusters inﬂuence each other, too? In table 1 I subsume the mutual interdepen-
dencies of the diﬀerent MEA clusters we reveal in chapter 2. Please read from left to
right to see which cluster has an impact on which cluster. For example MEAs related to
chemicals and hazardous wastes and MEAs classiﬁed with regional seas inﬂuence all other
MEA clusters, meanwhile land related MEAs only aﬀect biodiversity MEAs. And MEAs
classiﬁed with land or biodiversity have no impact on themselves. Thus, for these MEA
clusters we cannot measure a dynamic linear feedback of the regarded cluster. In a nutshell
MEA clusters vary tremendously with respect to their mutual inﬂuences. Another beneﬁt
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from classifying MEAs with diﬀerent clusters is that thereby we are able to measure a sig-
niﬁcant impact of environmental determinants we could not verify by regressions covering
all MEAs unclassiﬁed, such as in chapter 1. For example CO2 emissions have a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on MEAs related to land and MEAs classiﬁed with chemicals and
hazardous wastes. But interestingly CO2 emissions inﬂuence atmosphere related MEAs
positively. This means, while a country’s level of CO2 emissions lowers the possibility of
that country to ratify another MEA in the context of land or chemicals and hazardous
wastes, it ramps up the country’s eﬀorts in MEAs classiﬁed with atmosphere. Due to this,
counties emitting much CO2 seem to be aware of their contribution to global warming and
consequently try to ﬁnd other countries that signal the will to cooperate on abating it.
We know now what determinants drive MEA membership. But does the growing number
of MEAs be of any worth in eﬀective environmental protection, in particular in reducing
CO2 emissions? This question I am going to answer in chapter 3. Here I focus on the
future set-up of atmosphere related MEAs until 2050 and make use of the interactions
of per capita CO2 emissions and GDP per capita via the Environmental Kuznets Curve.
Employing a simulation based forecasting method and with the aid of IPCC IS922 growth
rates for population and GDP I project CO2 emissions with and without additionally con-
trolling for the impact of atmosphere MEAs. Hereby I am able to ﬁlter out the CO2
emission reduction eﬀect which can be credited to multilateral environmental agreements
classiﬁed with atmosphere. I can show that the desired impact of another Kyoto Protocol
or a worldwide eﬀective post Kyoto Protocol can be achieved with many small steps by
a growing number of atmosphere MEAs. With diﬀerent linear and non-linear projection
approaches I span a corridor of potential CO2 emission scenarios which are located near
around the CO2 emission projection of the IPCC A1B scenario
3. Thus, a worldwide mod-
2cf. Pepper, Xing, Chen, and Moss (1992)
3cf. IPCC SRES (2000); IPCC TAR (2001); Pepper, Xing, Chen, and Moss (1992)
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erate growing number of atmosphere MEAs can bring about sustainable developments and
helps to succeed CO2 emission goals world leaders assigned by means of the Copenhagen
Accord4 in 2009, i.e., to limit global temperature rise to below 2∘C.
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Multilateral Environmental Agreement Membership 2
Abstract∗
Environmental agreements represent voluntary coalitions which mostly regulate emissions
and the exhaustion of natural resources. The analysis of why and under which conditions
countries (or policy makers) may be inclined towards concluding such agreements or not
has been the focus of a body of theoretical work at the interface of environmental economics
and the economics of coalition games. Traditional theoretical work predicted that envi-
ronmental agreements are hard to sustain due to the lacking enforceability of associated
contracts and the incentive to free-ride. This hypothesis is at odds with the enormous surge
of such agreements in reality over the last few decades. Recent work by Rose and Spiegel
(2009) suggests that environmental agreements will be concluded and are stable, because
they work as a signal and help economies to get access to export (and possibly other) cred-
its. Hence, the reason for a conclusion of such agreements is their interdependence with
other policies, especially ones that are related to international business. This chapter sheds
light on the determinants of multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) participation.
In particular, we pay attention to the role of a country’s international openness by means of
chosen trade and investment policies for such participation. The results support the view
that wealthier countries with a strong inclination towards trade and investment liberaliza-
tion are more in favor of committing themselves voluntarily to environmental standards,
pollution reduction, and other means of environmental protection through MEA member-
ships than other countries, all else equal.
1.1 Introduction
“...environmentalist non-governmental organizations view free
trade pure with suspicion.” (Frank Trentman, Free Trade Nation,
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 23)
Freeness of trade and multinational investment are often seen as major obstacles to the
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Peter Egger and Mario Larch.
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protection of natural resources and the avoidance or reduction of emissions.1 Yet, parallel
to the spread of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements, we observed
an enormous surge of memberships in bilateral and – more importantly – in multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) over the last four decades.2 The ﬁrst MEA of our
sample – the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and Their
Protection Against Pests and Diseases – has been concluded in 1960, it covered 8 countries
and dealt with plant protection. Until 2006, another 353 MEAs have been enacted. By that
year, the median country among the 186 most important economies was involved in no less
than 51 MEAs. An obvious question to ask is whether the large number of environmental
agreements has been signed in spite or rather because of the almost ubiquitous liberalization
of trade and investment.
From the perspective of traditional theoretical work on environmental coalitions (see Chan-
der and Tulkens, 1992; Finus and Rundshagen, 1998b; Finus, van Ierland, and Dellink,
2006; Hoel, 1992; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; Carraro, Eyckmans, and Finus, 2006; Bar-
rett and Stavins, 2003; Barrett, 2001; Barrett, 1994; Buchholz, Haupt, and Peters, 2005)
the surge in MEA memberships is puzzling. Such membership is voluntary and there is
no supranational institution to enforce commitments expressed in the associated contracts.
Hence, when interpreting environmental agreements as ones that are concluded in isolation
1For instance, Greenpeace (2003a, p. 1) argues that “The free trade agenda is increasing the production
and consumption of natural resources at a rapid rate. This is adding to the destruction of ancient forests,
leading to overﬁshing, as well as creating more and more pollution. WTO rules are also being used to
undermine global environmental agreements, principles and standards”. Moreover, Greenpeace (2003b, p.
1) notes that “Trade rules can undermine environmental rules, laws and regulations. [...] Because of this,
countries are less likely to take action under certain global environmental agreements.” Finally, they state
that “Free trade is accelerating the use of natural resources such as water, forests, ﬁsheries, and minerals,
much faster than they can be regenerated.” While these remarks mostly pertain to the consequences of
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and, hence, multilateral trade liberalization –
environmental activists have similar reservations vis-a`-vis the formation of preferential trade agreements
(see Hanyona, 2000; Hochstetler, 2002, 2003).
2MEAs may be grouped into ﬁve categories relating to the target of environmental protection: bio-
diversity; atmosphere; land; chemicals and hazardous wastes; and regional seas and related agreements.
Their objectives and priorities vary signiﬁcantly not only across these groups but even within them.
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of other means of economic policy, there is little reason for countries to adopt costly mea-
sures required to fulﬁll their voluntary contracts. However, environmental agreements are
only one dimension of a large array of economic policies, among them other agreements re-
garding trade, investment, health, etc. With a manifold of international agreements, it may
be optimal for a country to voluntarily commit itself to costly environmental protection if
it can inﬂuence economic outcomes (e.g., through other agreements) which are only indi-
rectly or not at all related to environmental issues. In that vein, Rose and Spiegel (2009)
argue and illustrate that participation in bilateral environmental agreements provides a
signal which leads to easier access to capital assets from partners in such agreements.
It is this chapter’s task to shed light on the determinants of a country’s MEA member-
ships empirically. In particular, we investigate how trade liberalization – e.g., through
membership in preferential trade agreements – or investment liberalization aﬀect MEA
membership. Clearly, membership in MEAs is mainly reﬂective of environmental protec-
tion. Are trade and investment liberalization stepping stones or stumbling blocks to MEA
membership and, in turn, to environmental protection? We collect data on the universe of
MEAs concluded between 1960 and 2006 to assess this question. Our results suggest that
international economic coalitions about trade and cross-border direct investment stimulate
MEA memberships. This provides broad support for the arguments of Rose and Spiegel
(2009): An increasing dependence of countries upon each other through the process of glob-
alization stimulates or raises the pressure to agree upon eventually costly environmental
protection.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The subsequent section provides a
review of previous research on the conclusion of environmental agreements. Section 1.3
explores key features of the data on MEA membership in a large panel of countries and
years. In particular, this section will illustrate that such memberships are highly persistent
so that dynamic methods should be applied in empirical work. Diﬀerent impacts provoking
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countries to ratify MEAs are discussed in section 1.4, and section 1.5 brieﬂy introduces the
econometric methods applied to estimate the regression parameters of interest. Section
1.6 presents and discusses the ﬁndings and quantiﬁes the impact of trade and investment
liberalization on MEA memberships. The last section concludes with a summary of the
most important results.
1.2 Previous work on environmental agreement
membership
For convenience, let us structure the discussion of the state of the debate about environ-
mental agreement membership along the lines of theoretical and empirical work.
1.2.1 Economic theory of environmental agreements
Economic theory emphasizes the public good character of a clean environment. One reason
why environmental agreements are hard to conclude is the prisoners’ dilemma associated
with the public good character of the environment. As an example, Weikard, Finus, and
Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) analyze the stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement
under diﬀerent sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. Due to the prisoners’
dilemma, only coalitions with a few members turn out to be stable under diﬀerent shar-
ing rules. Among many other theoretical works (see section 1.1), this demonstrates the
diﬃculty to conclude MEAs.
Other papers emphasize the role of communications and negotiations in order to over-
come the prisoners’ dilemma associated with the conclusion of MEAs (see Carraro, 1998;
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Bloch and Gomes, 2006; Caparro´s, Hammoudi, and Tazda¨ıt, 2004; Carraro, Marchiori, and
Sgobbi, 2005).3
In contrast to the above work, Breton, Sbragia, and Zaccour (2008) focus on the dynamics
of international environmental agreement memberships in a dynamic game of emissions.
Their model of the evolution and stability of such agreements can lead to diﬀerent steady
states of full cooperation or partial cooperation, which are stable over time, and also to
situations without feasible or stable agreements. The outcome depends on the number
of initially cooperating countries, the level of pollution, and the way and extent to which
defectors may be punished.
Rose and Spiegel (2009) study the consequences of the interaction between economic and
non-economic relations for environmental agreement membership. An increase in the num-
ber of environmental agreements has a positive impact on cross-holding assets. A larger
number of such agreements represents a non-economic commitment to joint interests which
is a credible signal for a country’s discount rate. In turn, this facilitates economic exchange
in general and stimulates the cross-holding of assets in speciﬁc.
1.2.2 Empirical analysis of environmental agreements
Previous empirical work on the formation of environmental coalitions and agreements ei-
ther focused on single multilateral agreements or on a subset of the existing bilateral or
multilateral agreements. Others focus on a small subset of countries or regions (see Beron,
3These theoretical models form the basis of some climate change simulation models – such as the
CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (CWS) (see Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003), the Stability of Coalitions
Model (STACO) (see Finus, van Ierland, and Dellink, 2006), or the Climate Framework for Uncertainty,
Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND) (see Swanson and Manson, 2002; Tol, 2001; Tol, 1997). These
models suggest that the detection of environmental depletion through climate change, the correspond-
ing inﬂuences on the economy, and the value of cooperation facilitate the conclusion of environmental
agreements.
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Murdoch, and Vijverberg, 2003; Murdoch, Sandler, and Vijverberg, 2003; Davies and
Naughton, 2006; Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2006; Sugiyama
and Sinton, 2005; Swanson and Mason, 2002).
For instance, Beron, Murdoch, and Vijverberg (2003) develop a correlated probit model
to study the probability to ratify the Montreal Protocol for the 89 largest countries of the
world economy. They distinguish above all between “power” and “spillover” determinants
of these countries. Power is reﬂected in the inﬂuence a country has on the net beneﬁt of
ratifying the Montreal Protocol similar to positive network correlations. “Spillovers” allow
to internalize partly the detrimental eﬀect of an emission of ozone-depleting substances on
other countries than the emitting one. The higher the contemporary emissions of a coun-
try the higher its relative cutback of emissions will be and the more important its role in
emission-reducing agreements should be. Accordingly, “spillovers” generate correlations in
the decisions through trade with other countries. However, Beron, Murdoch, and Vijver-
berg (2003) did not ﬁnd evidence of a role for “power”, contrary to the hypotheses. But
they admit that further research would be needed to explore this matter.
Murdoch, Sandler, and Vijverberg (2003) focus on the ratiﬁcation of the Helsinki Proto-
col (which regulates sulfur emissions in Europe) in 1990. They derive hypotheses about
environmental treaty participation in a two-stage game. In a ﬁrst stage, countries decide
whether to participate in an agreement at all or not. In a second stage, they determine
the level of participation or the extent of concessions made – i.e., emissions reduced. Em-
pirically, they employ a spatial probit model to estimate the probability of participation
in the Helsinki Protocol for 25 European countries to estimate the ﬁrst-stage part of their
theoretical model. Their results suggest that a higher level of a country’s pollution and the
marginal costs of emission reductions exert a signiﬁcant positive impact on the probability
of participation. Other variables do not display a signiﬁcant impact in the spatial binary
choice model.
Chapter 1 – Trade and Investment Liberalization as Determinants of
Multilateral Environmental Agreement Membership 8
In a working paper, Davies and Naughton (2006) analyze the role of cross border pollution
as an incentive to cooperate with neighboring countries in multilateral environmental agree-
ments. In particular, they hypothesize that the probability of an environmental agreement
in place declines with geographical distance between two countries. They estimate the
role of determinants of membership based on 41 countries, 37 international environmental
agreements, and the period 1980-1999. Using a spatial model for normally distributed,
unlimited independent variables, and cross-sectional data, they ﬁnd evidence of increased
cooperation among proximate countries. Moreover, an increase in inward FDI or OECD
membership raise the probability of participation in one of the 37 agreements.
Rose and Spiegel (2009) study the economic beneﬁts of non-economic partnerships such as
environmental agreements. Using a sample of 221 country-pairs and the period 2001-2003,
they provide empirical evidence of the increased cross-holdings of assets at the country-pair
level if an environmental agreement is in place. Hence, countries may raise bilateral capital
ﬂows when participating in environmental agreements. Their evidence suggests that this
is true for both bilateral and multilateral environmental agreement participation.
1.3 Data on MEA participation
Before turning to regression analysis it is advisable to study features of the data on MEA
participation which will represent the dependent variable of our empirical models. The
basis of our MEA data forms the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center’s (SEDAC)
database on environmental agreements which is maintained by the Center for International
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN, 2006). Among all existing MEAs, we focus on
ones dealing with anyone of the ﬁve core issues: biodiversity; atmosphere; land; chemicals
and hazardous wastes; and regional seas and related agreements. Hence, we abstract
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from other agreements which regulate economic, social, cultural, space, or noise issues. It
turns out that SEDAC’s database is not complete and contains some errors. Therefore,
we augmented and updated the information by using data from Mitchell (2003, 2007)4.
This augmented data set covers the universe of MEAs addressing the considered issues.
Altogether, 353 such agreements have been concluded among subsets of the 186 countries
between 1960 and 2006. The dependent variable we focus on varies across countries and
years. It is a count of the number of agreements a country is a member of in a year
within the considered time span. Since this variable is strictly non-negative, methods for
unlimited dependent variables are unlikely appropriate for empirical analysis.
Figure 1.1: Time course of the number of MEAs between 1960 and 2006
After 1972, the year of the Stockholm Conference, the number of MEAs has risen tremen-
dously. Inter alia because of the conclusion of the Montreal Protocol, the number of MEA
memberships has also increased after 1989. Figure 1.1 illustrates that MEA participation
is not only but mainly a phenomenon in the developed part of the world. Please notice that
4We gratefully acknowledge provision of the data by Ron Mitchell.
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the number of MEAs of the European Union (EU) declines in 20045. The reason for this
has to do with the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union which will be discussed
later by means of ﬁgures 1.2 and 1.3.
In addition to the development of MEA membership over time we provide further details
on the geographical spread of MEAs with the help of maps. In particular, we display MEA
membership – according to the deﬁnitions stated above – for both the world and Europe in
the year 2006. The ﬁgures clearly illustrate that there is a region-speciﬁc impact inﬂuencing
countries towards participation in MEAs.6 Obviously, countries in Europe ratify a good
deal more MEAs than countries in Africa or Asia (cf. ﬁgure 1.2). A closer look on Europe
illustrates the discrepancies between countries in diﬀerent developing stages (see ﬁgure
1.3). Particularly Western European economies are much more inclined to participate in
MEAs than Central and Eastern European ones. Consequently, in 2004 the enlargement
of the EU by Central and Eastern European countries, Cyprus, and Malta is responsible
for the decline in the average number of MEAs of the EU.
At this point, in general, correlations between MEAs and economic, political, and en-
vironmental determinants are easily to identify. But less obviously is the extent of the
“connectedness” of countries due to trade or investment agreements and the accordant
impact on MEA participation.
5In ﬁgure 1.1 we show the number of MEAs ratiﬁed by individual countries as well as country aggre-
gates. Among the latter are the European Union (EU), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the least developed countries (LDCs), and the world as a whole. Aggregates are
represented by the respective countries’ average number of MEAs in each year. As deﬁnitions of these ag-
gregates can change over time the corresponding number of MEAs can form a – to some extent – unsteady
but persistent trend. For instance, within our data the EU started with 6 members in 1969, enlarged
to 10 members in 1983, and ﬁnally contains 25 members in 2006. LDCs are deﬁned in accordance with
the classiﬁcation of United Nations’ Oﬃce of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries,
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS).
6Please notice that there are a few white areas in the maps indicating missing countries in our data.
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Figure 1.2: Number of MEAs in 2006 - The World
Figure 1.3: Number of MEAs in 2006 - Europe
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1.4 Determinants of MEA membership
We use a set of explanatory variables to capture the most important determinants of
MEA membership. In line with the aforementioned theoretical work on environmental
agreements, we include and distinguish between three groups of explanatory variables:
economic, political, and environmental covariates.
1.4.1 Economic determinants
As for the economic determinants of MEA membership, we include real gross domestic
product (GDP) as a measure of a country’s economic mass from Maddison’s (2003) his-
torical time-series which is available for a large set of countries and years. To cover more
recent years, we extrapolate GDP data by using indices of the growth of GDP at real U.S.
dollars from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. Similarly, we gather
information about population size from these two sources. The inclusion of log population
together with log GDP accounts for size as well as income per capita in the empirical
models. In the tables we use acronyms LGDP and LPOP to refer to log GDP and log
population, respectively.
Furthermore, we include a binary variable LDC which is unity for the least developed
countries and zero else. This indicator is provided by the United Nations Oﬃce of the
High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries
and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS). Among the 186 countries in our data-
set, 48 are LDCs according to that deﬁnition.
Finally, we include two economic determinants of primary interest to our study: a mea-
sure of a country’s trade liberalization (i.e., the inverse of trade costs) and the number
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of bilateral investment treaties. We refer to the former as TRADE LIBERAL and to the
latter as INVEST LIBERAL. TRADE LIBERAL measures the importance of bilateral and
multilateral trade costs – most importantly for us, it is a measure of bilateral and mul-
tilateral trade facilitation, especially but not only, through preferential trade agreement
(PTA) membership. INVEST LIBERAL is a measure of a country’s investment liberal-
ization through bilateral investment treaties (BITs). While INVEST LIBERAL simply
reﬂects the number of BITs of a country, TRADE LIBERAL respects direct and indirect
consequences of trade costs – such as PTA membership for trade – as pointed out by work
in international economics (see Anderson, 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). We
use the logarithm of total (direct and indirect) consequences of trade frictions and trade
liberalization as a measure of TRADE LIBERAL.
TRADE LIBERAL is a constructed variable from a non-linear regression model, follow-
ing the approach to estimate gravity models by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We
calculate TRADE LIBERAL annually by using the corresponding values of exporter and
importer GDP and trade costs as well as PTA membership. Nominal bilateral goods ex-
ports of country 푖 to country 푗 in year 푡 in U.S. dollars, 푋푖푗푡, may be expressed in the
following way (see Feenstra, 2004, for a discussion):
푋푖푗푡 =
퐺퐷푃푖푡퐺퐷푃푗푡
퐺퐷푃푊푡
푡1−휎푖푗푡 Π
1−휎
푖푡 푃
1−휎
푗푡 , (1.1)
where 퐺퐷푃푖푡 ≡
∑푁
푗 (푋푖푗푡), 퐺퐷푃푗푡 ≡
∑푁
푖 (푋푗푖푡) denotes nominal GDP of countries 푖
and 푗, respectively, in year 푡, 푁 denotes the number of countries in the world economy,
and 퐺퐷푃푊푡 ≡
∑푁
푖
∑푁
푗 (푋푖푗푡) is world GDP in year 푡. 휎 > 1 is the constant elasticity
of substitution among products/varieties, 푡푖푗푡 are economic trade costs (including PTA
membership indicators and other variables), and Π푖푡, 푃푗푡 are so-called multilateral resistance
terms – measuring country 푖’s outward and country 푗’s inward multilateral trade costs,
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respectively, in year 푡. For our purpose, we calculate
TRADE LIBERAL푖푡 = ln
푁∑
푗=1푗 ∕=푖
(
퐺퐷푃푖푡퐺퐷푃푗푡
퐺퐷푃푊푡
푡1−휎푖푗푡 Π
1−휎
푖푡 푃
1−휎
푗푡
)
, (1.2)
which is the predicted sum of exports of country 푖 to all countries in the world (i.e., the
data-set) in year 푡.
Empirically,
퐺퐷푃푖푡퐺퐷푃푗푡
퐺퐷푃푊푡
is observable, but 푡1−휎푖푗푡 Π
1−휎
푖푡 푃
1−휎
푗푡 is not. We adopt the common
assumption to model trade costs as
푡1−휎푖푗푡 = 푒푥푝
[
퐾∑
푘
(훿푘휏푘,푖푗푡)
]
, (1.3)
where 퐾 denotes the number of trade cost or trade facilitation variables 휏푘,푖푗푡 included
in 푡1−휎푖푗푡 , and 훿푘 is a parameter of the 푘’th variable. While 휏푘,푖푗푡 is observed, 훿푘 has to
be estimated. Estimates of 훿푘 are obtained from a gravity regression model, after in-
cluding a stochastic term in (1.1), see Appendix 1.A.2 for details. For convenience and
in line with the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), continuous variables
in 휏푘,푖푗푡 such as bilateral geographical distance enter in logarithmic form while indicator
variables such as bilateral PTA membership enter as they are. Similar to 푡1−휎푖푗푡 , Π
1−휎
푖푡 , and
푃 1−휎푗푡 are unobserved. Yet, they can be solved as solutions of a nonlinear system of 2푁
equations which are based upon knowledge of GDPs and estimates of 푡1−휎푖푗푡 (see Appendix
1.A.2 for details). We use data on nominal exports 푋푖푗푡 in U.S. dollars from the United
Nations World Trade Database, information on PTA membership from the World Bank,
and variables on other trade costs (such as geographical distance, adjacency, or common
language) from a data set made publicly available by the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Ultimately, with estimates of 푡1−휎푖푗푡 , Π
1−휎
푖푡 , and
푃 1−휎푗푡 , we can estimate TRADE LIBERAL. We can also compute counterfactual values
of TRADE LIBERAL which are based on the assumption that ceteris paribus all PTAs
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would be abandoned world-wide.7 The diﬀerence between the cum-PTA vector of TRADE
LIBERAL and the counterfactual sine-PTA vector of TRADE LIBERAL is a measure of
the combined bilateral and multilateral consequences of PTA membership on a country’s
log exports. With this diﬀerence and a parameter estimate of TRADE LIBERAL in the
speciﬁcation of MEA memberships at hand, we can compute the total impact of PTA
membership on MEA membership (see tables 1.7 to 1.10 in Section 1.6.2).
The impact of INVEST LIBERAL on MEA membership is straightforward. INVEST
LIBERAL reﬂects a country’s number of BITs in a given year.8 Information on the number
of BITs for each country and year is taken from the United Nations Conference of Trade and
Development Treaty Database (UNCTAD, 2007). Similar to MEA and PTA membership,
the number of BITs varies considerably over time. If all BITs were abandoned in all
years in a counterfactual situation, INVEST LIBERAL would represent a vector of zeros.
Accordingly, after having estimated the parameter of INVEST LIBERAL in a speciﬁcation
of MEA memberships, we can compare the predicted number of MEA memberships for
each country in a situation with BITs (and INVEST LIBERAL) as observed as compared
to one without any BITs.
For estimation we apply a quasi-diﬀerencing transformation following
Wooldridge (1997). This GMM estimator has the advantage that it can deal with po-
tentially endogenous regressors where 퐸(푥푖푡푢푖푡) ∕= 0. Hence, as TRADE LIBERAL or
INVEST LIBERAL may be endogenous, we employ the following valid moment condi-
tions: 퐸(푞푖푡∣푦푖푡−2, 푥푖푡−2) = 0 (for more details see Appendix 1.A.1).
7Abandoning PTAs will not only aﬀect 푡1−휎푖푗푡 but also Π
1−휎
푖푡 and 푃
1−휎
푗푡 and even GDP. All of that has
to and will be taken into account when calculating counterfactual TRADE LIBERAL.
8It would be possible to allow for bilateral and multilateral eﬀects of such treaties similar to trade costs
as in TRADE LIBERAL. However, unlike with trade costs there is no closed-form solution to capture
bilateral and multilateral (direct and indirect) eﬀects of bilateral investment treaties. Also, we would not
expect similar strong multilateral eﬀects of bilateral investment treaties as of preferential trade agreements.
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1.4.2 Political determinants
We have experimented with a variety of political indicators from various sources in the
speciﬁcation. For example, we included variables measuring the autocracy of a country, the
durability of a country’s political regime, and variable measuring the political competition
in the government of a country. These variables are based on the data collected in the
Polity IV Project (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2007). Most of them did not exhibit suﬃcient
variation over time to be included in the empirical model and led to poor convergence
properties of the GMM estimators.
Here, we only present results which involve the index of political freedom (PFI) as con-
structed by the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, and Leeson, 2007) as a
political determinant of MEA membership. This index ranges from 1 to 10, with higher
values indicating greater political freedom. Hereby we conﬁrm the results of Congleton
(1992) and Neumayer (2002) who found a positive systematical impact of political institu-
tions on environmental regulations.
1.4.3 Environmental determinants
Finally, we include two environmental determinants of MEA membership: a country’s CO2
emissions per capita (CO2 EMISSIONS) and a country’s endowment with agricultural
land (in percent of its total land area; AGRLAND). Both of them are taken from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. We also experimented with other
variables such as total CO2 emissions from fossil-fuels (thousand metric tons of carbon),
CO2 emissions from solid fuel consumption (metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from
liquid fuel consumption (metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from gas fuel consumption
(metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions from cement production (metric tons of carbon),
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CO2 emissions from gas ﬂaring (metric tons of carbon), CO2 emissions (metric tons of
carbon), CO2 emissions from gas ﬂaring, combustible renewables and waste (percent of
total energy), combustible renewables and waste (metric tons of oil equivalent), electric
power consumption (kWh or kWh per capita), energy imports (net percent of energy
use), energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita), forest area (sq. km), land area (sq.
km), organic water pollutant emissions (kg per day or kg per day per worker), permanent
cropland (percent of land area), surface area (sq. km), and water pollution (percent of
total organic water pollutant emissions) of the chemical industry, clay and glass industry,
food industry, metal industry, paper and pulp industry, textile industry, wood industry
and other industries. All of them are available to download from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. However, these environmental variables are highly collinear with
the included covariates (such as CO2 EMISSIONS and AGRLAND) and they do not
contribute signiﬁcantly to the explanatory power of the model.9
Please notice that not all of the mentioned possible determinants of MEA participation are
available for all of the 186 countries. After dropping those countries for which determinants
are missing, we are left with 105 economies of which 17 are LDCs according to the deﬁnition
of UN-OHRLLS. The subsequent regression results are based on these 105 economies (see
table 1.1).
1.5 Econometric model
The descriptive features of the data on a country’s participation in MEAs over time display
a strong persistence. In any given period, the number of MEAs a country participates in has
a strong impact on its subsequent involvement in MEAs. Hence, apart from fundamental
9Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1.1: Statistics of balanced data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
YEAR 4935 1983 13.5660 1960 2006
NUMBER OF MEAs (푦푖푡) 4935 35.0315 36.4441 0 222
LGDP 4935 23.6735 2.1325 17.8967 30.0656
LPOP 4935 9.3836 1.4536 6.2085 14.0895
TRADE LIBERAL 4935 1.3396 1.8038 -4.1154 5.2542
INVEST LIBERAL 4935 9.9377 18.8965 0 131
LDC 4935 0.1603 0.3669 0 1
PFI 4935 3.8524 1.9589 1 9.6
CO2 EMISSIONS 4935 3.7618 4.4578 -0.0197 27.7664
AGRLAND 4935 42.4408 21.3902 0.6278 91.7850
economic, political, or environmental determinants of MEA membership, a country’s MEA
history should be allowed to play a role.10 This feature may be captured by the inclusion
of a lagged dependent variable in the econometric model. We do so by following Blundell,
Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002) to model the dynamics of the number of MEAs a country
participates in as a linear feedback model (LFM). The LFM assumes that the conditional
mean of a dependent count variable is linear in the history of the process.11
Let 푦푖푡 denote the number of MEAs country 푖, 푖 = 1, ..., 푁 , is a member of in year 푡,
푡 = 1, ..., 푇 . Further, let 푥푖푡 represent a vector of 퐾 explanatory variables. The conditional
10If history matters, cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of MEA participation is diﬃcult to
interpret since the estimated responses may reﬂect short-run or long-run eﬀects.
11For a good overview article of GMM for panel count data models see Windmeijer (2008).
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mean in the LFM is then deﬁned as
퐸 (푦푖푡∣푦푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖) = 훾푦푖푡−1 + 푒푥푝 (푥′푖푡훽) 푣푖 (1.4)
= 훾푦푖푡−1 + 휇푖푡휈푖,
where 휈푖 ≡ 푒푥푝(휂푖) is a permanent scaling factor for the individual speciﬁc mean, and 훾
and 훽 are parameters to be estimated. The LFM can be motivated as an entry-exit process
with the probability of exit equal to (1 − 훾). Note that 휇푖푡휈푖 is non-negative, so that the
mean value for 푦푖푡 is bounded below by 훾푦푖푡−1.
To avoid simultaneity bias every explanatory variable enters in their ﬁrst lag into our
regressions. By this means, we are able to cancel out the Granger feedback system between
the number of MEAs and trade and investment treaties.12 Using the lagged values of the
explanatory variables relies on the plausible assumption that past values of the explanatory
variables inﬂuence future development of the number of MEAs but does not aﬀect past
ones. Using this time structure, we make sure that the impact of trade and investment
treaties goes in the right direction.
We apply several generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. First we use a one-
step estimator, where the moments weighting matrix does not depend on the parameters
to be estimated. In order to gain in eﬃciency, we also apply an eﬃcient two-step GMM
which uses the estimates from the one-step estimator for the moments weighting matrix.
Additionally, we apply a continuously updated GMM estimator that directly accounts for
the dependence of the moments weighting matrix on the parameters in the optimization
(see Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron, 1996).13
12Rose and Spiegel (2009) show a positive impact of environmental agreements on bilateral trade ﬂows.
We use the number of MEAs as the dependent variable and trade as the explanatory one.
13Additionally to the eﬃciency, an advantage of the continuously updated estimator is that it is invariant
to curvature altering transformations of the population moment conditions (see Hall, 2005).
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As demonstrated by Windmeijer (2002), the two-step GMM estimator can be severely
biased downwards in small samples, i.e., for small 푁 . This small sample bias also applies
to the continuously updating GMM estimator. We therefore use a ﬁnite sample correction
in order to account for the small sample bias by applying block-bootstrapping14. Further
details on the applied estimators can be found in Appendix 1.A.1.
1.6 Results
This section is structured as follows. We will ﬁrst summarize the parameter estimates
of four diﬀerent GMM estimators based on the aforementioned empirical speciﬁcation of
MEA participation. Then, we will ask how important interconnectedness through trade
and investment policy is for MEA participation in quantitative terms. Clearly, the nonlin-
ear nature of the econometric model does not allow for a straightforward answer to that
question which only rests upon parameter estimates. To shed light on the matter, let us
focus on the role of trade liberalization and undertake some radical experiments. First,
let us abandon all PTAs concluded world-wide in all years covered in our data set. Sec-
ond, let us abandon all BITs in the same way. These experiments are helpful to quantify
the relative as well as the absolute role of trade and investment liberalization for MEA
participation.
14For the one-step and two-step GMM estimators we relied on the ExpEnd GAUSS routines which are
made publicly available by Windmeijer (2002). An alternative possibility to account for the small sample
bias was proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
Chapter 1 – Trade and Investment Liberalization as Determinants of
Multilateral Environmental Agreement Membership 21
1.6.1 Parameter estimates
Our results are summarized in tables 1.2 to 1.4. In every table there are four columns. The
ﬁrst column refers to results based on the one-step GMM estimator, labeled “ONE-STEP”,
column two reports estimates based on the eﬃcient two-step GMM estimator, denoted by
“TWO-STEP”, the third column summarizes ﬁndings based on the continuously updated
GMM estimates, labeled “CUGMM”, and the last column reﬂects block-bootstrap results,
denoted “BOOTSTRAP”, which correct the small-sample bias in the estimates of the
standard errors of the other estimators.
In all our speciﬁcations, the instruments turn out to be valid at conventional signiﬁcance
levels according to the Sargan over-identiﬁcation test. We further tested for ﬁrst-order
and second-order serial correlation. With residuals of the quasi-diﬀerenced transformation
following Wooldridge, we expect ﬁrst-order but not second-order serial correlation. We
conﬁrm this pattern largely in our estimates.
The lagged dependent variable, labeled as “푦푖푡−1”, exhibits a positive parameter estimate
which is highly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all models. This suggests that there is
indeed strong persistence in the number of MEAs concluded by countries. Neglecting this
persistence and sluggish adjustment in response to changes in its determinants would likely
invalidate estimates based on static models of MEA membership.
An increase in economic mass, as captured by LGDP, leads to an increase in the number of
MEAs concluded by a country. Holding population constant, this suggests that marginally
wealthier countries are more inclined towards MEA participation than less wealthier ones.
This statistically signiﬁcant result occurs in all model estimations and is consistent with the
Environmental Kuznets Curve which assumes an inverted U-shaped relationship between
the level of GDP and environmental pollution. Smaller values of GDP are associated
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Table 1.2: Baseline parameter estimates
ONE-STEP TWO-STEP CUGMM
BOOT-
STRAP
Lagged dependent variable:
푦푖푡−1 0.1797∗∗∗ 0.1805∗∗∗ 0.1796∗∗∗ 0.1856∗∗∗
(10.7874) (61.3027) (189.5914) (8.2044)
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.5831
∗∗∗ 0.5835∗∗∗ 0.5430∗∗∗ 0.5706∗∗∗
(8.963) (133.3069) (115.8703) (6.2472)
LPOP푖푡 0.0662 0.0725
∗∗∗ 0.8542∗∗∗ 0.0575
(0.9534) (7.8487) (48.3054) (0.9184)
TRADE 0.3568∗∗∗ 0.3573∗∗∗ 0.4470∗∗∗ 0.3478∗∗∗
LIBERAL푖푡 (6.0775) (47.9151) (334.3223) (5.0946)
INVEST 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
LIBERAL푖푡 (5.3570) (34.8477) (68.5053) (4.7232)
LDC푖푡 0.0792 0.0905 1.8611
∗∗∗ 0.0268
(0.2288) (0.3333) (6.5934) (0.1023)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are
signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 105 countries and
4,725 observations in all four models. The parameters are estimated over the
period 1962-2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the
independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961
are used as instruments for 1962). The p-value of the Sargan test statistic of
over-identifying restrictions is 0.1563 in the ONE-STEP model.
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Table 1.3: Parameter estimates including political determinants
ONE-STEP TWO-STEP CUGMM
BOOT-
STRAP
Lagged dependent variable:
푦푖푡−1 0.1725∗∗∗ 0.1727∗∗∗ 0.1347∗∗∗ 0.1849∗∗∗
(10.3005) (53.6281) (100.5466) (6.4990)
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.5768
∗∗∗ 0.5783∗∗∗ 0.4608∗∗∗ 0.5463∗∗∗
(8.6261) (100.9385) (86.6106) (5.7752)
LPOP푖푡 0.0674 0.0718
∗∗∗ 0.9579∗∗∗ 0.0649
(0.9721) (8.1776) (46.3741) (1.0241)
TRADE 0.3496∗∗∗ 0.3487∗∗∗ 0.3785∗∗∗ 0.3327∗∗∗
LIBERAL푖푡 (5.7095) (43.7934) (310.7697) (4.7985)
INVEST 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗
LIBERAL푖푡 (5.3410) (32.0974) (88.1588) (4.5845)
LDC푖푡 0.1008 0.1137 1.0589
∗∗∗ 0.0382
(0.2917) (0.4210) (3.7494) (0.1385)
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0096
∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0239
(8.9747) (31.9805) (27.9396) (0.9910)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are
signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 105 countries and
4,725 observations in all four models. The parameters are estimated over the
period 1962-2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the
independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961
are used as instruments for 1962). The p-value of the Sargan test statistic of
over-identifying restrictions is 0.1518 in the ONE-STEP model.
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Table 1.4: Parameter estimates including environmental determinants
ONE-STEP TWO-STEP CUGMM
BOOT-
STRAP
Lagged dependent variable:
푦푖푡−1 0.1785∗∗∗ 0.1768∗∗∗ 0.1385∗∗∗ 0.1904∗∗∗
(9.1892) (44.3985) (64.0840) (6.1541)
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.5826
∗∗∗ 0.5879∗∗∗ 0.7244∗∗∗ 0.5593∗∗∗
(8.2293) (74.0002) (100.7637) (5.4012)
LPOP푖푡 0.0518 0.0581
∗∗∗ 0.3919∗∗∗ 0.0460
(0.7663) (6.9987) (39.4304) (0.6796)
TRADE 0.3397∗∗∗ 0.2759∗∗∗ 0.3919∗∗∗ 0.3283∗∗∗
LIBERAL푖푡 (5.7570) (44.2835) (58.1982) (4.8224)
INVEST 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
LIBERAL푖푡 (5.6497) (33.5298) (23.0466) (4.6575)
LDC푖푡 0.1099 0.1248 0.5887
∗ 0.0471
(0.3230) (0.4642) (2.1911) (0.1780)
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0092
∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0238
(8.6713) (35.0827) (116.5932) (0.9368)
Environmental determinants:
CO2 -0.0080 -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0091
EMISSIONS푖푡 (-0.8530) (-6.7420) (-39.7536) (-0.6205)
AGRLAND푖푡 -0.0026 -0.0024
∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0021
(-0.8803) (-5.3820) (21.1946) (-0.6117)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are
signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 105 countries and
4,725 observations in all four models. The parameters are estimated over the
period 1962-2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the
independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961
are used as instruments for 1962). The p-value of the Sargan test statistic of
over-identifying restrictions is 0.1544 in the ONE-STEP model.
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with less production and, hence, less pollution. As GDP rises, an increase in production
brings about more pollution. With even higher GDP, producers may face pressure towards
reducing pollution in spite of higher production volumes. Then it may be opportune
to engage in multilateral agreements. Our results are supportive to this positive nexus
between GDP and a country’s willingness to reduce pollution, indicated by a higher count
of MEAs15.
Results do not support an important role for log population (LPOP). Controlling for a
country’s economic mass in terms of LGDP a change in population size has no signiﬁcant
impact on the number of MEAs ratiﬁed by the average country. In contrast, political
freedom aﬀects MEA membership positively and signiﬁcantly. Hence, a higher degree of
political stability and democracy tends to stimulate a country’s willingness to engage in
international agreements such as MEAs, all else equal. In line with our expectations, a
higher degree of pollution in terms of CO2 emissions reduces a country’s willingness to
commit itself to less pollution through MEAs. However, the negative estimate of CO2
EMISSIONS is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels (cf. ONE-STEP
or BOOTSTRAP results in tables 1.2 to 1.4).
Results stated above are based on MEAs unclassiﬁed with respect to their environmental
issue. To shed light on diﬀerent cluster-speciﬁc relationships between trade and investment
liberalization we also ran separate regressions with diﬀerent clusters of MEAs, namely the
ones dealing with biodiversity, atmosphere, land, chemicals and hazardous wastes, and
seas16. Table 1.5 provides descriptive details about the regarded MEA clusters. Here,
maximum numbers of MEAs suggest that countries are most likely to sign and ratify
MEAs in the context of maritime issues (CLUSTER SEAS), followed by MEAs dealing
15Please notice that this conclusion cannot be contradicted by the insigniﬁcant impact of LDC on MEA
memberships if controlling for other determinants (cf. LDC in tables 1.2 to 1.4).
16This classiﬁcation is analogous to the MEA clusters of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP, 2001)
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Table 1.5: Statistics of balanced data for diﬀerent clusters of MEAs
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CLUSTER BIODIVERSITY 4935 3.9645 4.4206 0 27
CLUSTER ATMOSPHERE 4935 3.7929 5.4179 0 30
CLUSTER LAND 4935 2.8845 2.7611 0 21
CLUSTER CHEMICALS 4935 8.4548 8.4908 0 48
CLUSTER SEAS 4935 12.8917 15.2388 0 94
with chemicals and hazardous wastes (CLUSTER CHEMICALS). Less MEAs have been
ratiﬁed with respect to biodiversity, atmosphere, or land. Table 1.6 summarizes one-step
dynamic GMM regression results akin to the ones in the ﬁrst column of table 1.4. For
convenience, we repeat the one-step results from table 1.4 in the ﬁrst column of table 1.6.
Basically, results in table 1.6 draw a similar picture to the one obtained in table 1.4. A
coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the benchmark estimates in the
ﬁrst column always exhibits a similar sign in the cluster-speciﬁc regressions. Most of the
determinants show a similar qualitative and quantitative point estimate across the diﬀerent
clusters. For instance, better economic (GDP) and political (PFI) circumstances move
countries to ratify more MEAs. TRADE LIBERAL has a positive and highly signiﬁcant
eﬀect with similar magnitude in all regressions, except for the cluster atmosphere. However,
for this cluster we had to set the lag length of the instrument for the number of MEAs
strictly to two to achieve convergence. Since MEAs in this category are very persistent, the
instrument explained almost all of the variation in the number of atmosphere MEAs. This
becomes evident having a look at the parameter of the lagged dependent variable which
is close to unity for that MEA cluster. Hence, these results have to be taken with a grain
of salt. INVEST LIBERAL indicates a positive impact in all clusters. The corresponding
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parameter is positive, highly signiﬁcant, and of similar magnitude in the regressions of
the clusters biodiversity, land, and chemicals and hazardous wastes. But it does not have
a signiﬁcant impact on atmosphere – probably due to econometric reasons regarding the
persistence of the dependent variable – and on maritime issues (cf. the last column of table
1.6). Finally, if anything, a higher degree of per capita CO2 emissions leads to a lower
number of MEAs, as we can ﬁnd negative and signiﬁcant impacts of CO2 EMISSIONS in
the clusters land and chemicals and hazardous wastes.
Above all, our results can support the notion that a country’s interconnectedness in terms
of trade and investment raises its incentive to engage in MEAs, too. Both investment lib-
eralization, captured by INVEST LIBERAL, and trade liberalization, reﬂected in TRADE
LIBERAL, lead to an increase in the number of MEAs. While the immediate eﬀect on
MEAs due to the number of BITs is directly reﬂected in the parameter estimate of INVEST
LIBERAL, the role of PTAs is not immediately obvious from the parameter of TRADE
LIBERAL. The reason is that PTAs are related to TRADE LIBERAL in a highly non-
linear way. There is a positive eﬀect of PTA on TRADE LIBERAL17, which is fully in
line with ﬁndings reported in the literature on the consequences of trade liberalization for
trade ﬂows (for instance, see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, 2009). Consequently, a signiﬁ-
cant positive impact of PTA membership on TRADE LIBERAL together with a positive
signiﬁcant parameter of TRADE LIBERAL implies a positive eﬀect of PTA membership
for MEA participation.
Altogether, the results support the view that wealthier countries with a strong inclination
towards trade and investment liberalization are more in favor of committing themselves
voluntarily to environmental standards, pollution reduction, and other means of environ-
mental protection through MEA memberships than other countries, all else equal. At least
to some extent, this ﬁnding is at odds with concerns of environmental activists whereby
17The corresponding parameter is 0.022.
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Table 1.6: Parameter estimates for diﬀerent clusters of MEAs
Number
of MEAs
Bio-
diversity
Atmo-
sphere
Land Chemicals Seas
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦푖푡−1 0.1785∗∗∗
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0248
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.9997
∗∗∗
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0359
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.1088
∗∗∗
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.1283
∗∗∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.5826
∗∗∗ 0.7783∗∗∗ 0.8787 0.2248∗∗∗ 0.7265∗∗∗ 0.6430∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 0.0518 0.0196 -0.0478 0.2399
∗∗ 0.0070 0.0773
TRADE
LIBERAL푖푡
0.3397∗∗∗ 0.5522∗∗∗ 0.6090 0.2265∗∗ 0.5300∗∗∗ 0.4185∗∗∗
INVEST
LIBERAL푖푡
0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0034 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0006
LDC푖푡 0.1099 0.7622
∗∗ -0.1381 -0.1566 -0.1816 0.0781
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0092
∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0343 0.0023 0.0060∗∗ 0.0023
Environmental determinants:
CO2
EMISSIONS푖푡
-0.0080 -0.0153 0.1078 -0.0087∗∗ -0.0180∗ 0.0019
AGRLAND푖푡 -0.0026 0.0016 -0.0063 0.0031 0.0012 0.0002
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
There are 105 countries and 4,725 observations in all six ONE-STEP regressions. The
parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006. Once and twice lagged levels of the
dependent and the independent variables are used as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and
1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
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the globalization of goods trade and investments would be unambiguously detrimental for
pro-environmental movements and environmental protection.
1.6.2 The role of preferential trade liberalization for MEA par-
ticipation
Shutting down PTAs aﬀects TRADE LIBERAL through three types of channels. First
of all, it changes nominal exports in equation (1.1) directly through the trade cost term
푡1−휎푖푗 . Second, it aﬀects exports indirectly (and in the opposite way) through both exporter
and importer multilateral resistance terms Π푖 and 푃푗, respectively. Third, by aﬀecting
exports it exerts an indirect eﬀect on exporter, importer, and world GDP. Since GDPs
and the number of PTAs concluded across the years, TRADE LIBERAL is a time-variant
variable and the impact on TRADE LIBERAL of abandoning PTAs counterfactually is
heterogeneous across the years. The time-speciﬁc eﬀect of TRADE LIBERAL is then scaled
by the corresponding parameter estimate. However, notice that even a homogeneous change
in TRADE LIBERAL across countries and years would turn into heterogeneous eﬀects on
MEA membership by virtue of the nonlinear nature of the econometric model. The impact
of PTA membership in MEA participation is computed as the diﬀerence between the
model predictions of MEA participation cum PTAs and the one without any PTAs. For
predictions as well as counterfactual predictions we take ONE STEP estimates from table
1.4 as a basis.
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Table 1.7: Trade liberalization in the EU
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
EU counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 12 15 112 100
Min 1 11 10
Max 28 240 212
Std. Dev. 7 61 55
Table 1.8: Trade liberalization in the NAFTA
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
NAFTA counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 2 2 75 73
Min 1 59 58
Max 2 99 97
Std. Dev. 1 21 21
Table 1.9: Trade liberalization in the ROW
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
ROW counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 1 2 45 44
Min 0 5 5
Max 10 161 157
Std. Dev. 2 31 30
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Table 1.10: Trade liberalization in the WORLD
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
WORLD counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 4 5 62 58
Min 0 5 5
Max 28 240 212
Std. Dev. 6 49 44
For the ease of presentation, let us focus on a quantiﬁcation of PTA-induced eﬀects on
MEA participation in just one year, namely 2006, i.e., the last year in our data. Notice
that the impact of PTA membership on the number of MEAs is larger in 2006 than in
the 1960s, since the number of PTAs in place by 2006 was larger. Tables 1.7 to 1.10
summarize the quantitative eﬀects of PTAs in that year. There are four tables, since we
compute eﬀects for diﬀerent country-groups: European Union (EU18), North American
Free Trade Area (NAFTA19), the rest of the world (ROW), and the whole world covered
(i.e., 105 economies).
Each table has got four rows of data and four columns. The last two columns report
absolute predictions of MEAs concluded with and without PTAs for the average country
(in the top row) in each group considered in 200620. For the mean, the ﬁrst column is
simply the diﬀerence between the last two columns in each table. This is, of course, not
the case for the minimum predictions, maximum predictions, and standard deviations of
predictions.
18Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden
19Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
20We also report minimum and maximum eﬀects along with the standard deviation of the eﬀects across
the countries in each group.
Chapter 1 – Trade and Investment Liberalization as Determinants of
Multilateral Environmental Agreement Membership 32
Please notice that the ﬁrst column represents short-run – or contemporaneous – eﬀects of
PTA membership in 2006. Introducing all existing PTAs in 2006 relative to a situation
without any PTAs leads to an increase of about 4 MEAs for the average country in the
sample (see the upper left number in table 1.10). The eﬀect is much lower in absolute
terms for countries in the ROW (see the upper left number in table 1.9), and it is highest
for EU member countries (see the upper left number in table 1.7).
Among the four considered country-groups, the EU is the one with the largest number
of PTAs with other countries, while the ROW is the one with the smallest number of
PTAs. All things considered, our results point to a monotonic positive relationship be-
tween a country’s degree of preferential trade liberalization and the extent of voluntary
environmental commitments in terms of the number of MEAs ratiﬁed.
1.6.3 The role of bilateral investment treaties for MEA partici-
pation
In a similar vein, we may investigate the role of BITs for MEA membership. We shut
down BITs as before and compare the outcome in a situation cum BITs (where INVEST
LIBERAL corresponds to the number of BITs in place in a given year) with one sine BITs
(where INVEST LIBERAL is a vector of zeros).
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Table 1.11: Investment liberalization in the EU
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
EU counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 32 39 112 80
Min 0 11 9
Max 108 240 145
Std. Dev. 30 61 35
Table 1.12: Investment liberalization in the NAFTA
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
NAFTA counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 12 15 74 62
Min 6 59 54
Max 24 99 75
Std. Dev. 10 21 12
Table 1.13: Investment liberalization in the ROW
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
ROW counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 7 10 45 38
Min 0 5 5
Max 54 161 134
Std. Dev. 10 31 23
Chapter 1 – Trade and Investment Liberalization as Determinants of
Multilateral Environmental Agreement Membership 34
Table 1.14: Investment liberalization in the WORLD
Diﬀerence in prediction and Prediction Counterfactual
WORLD counterfactual prediction of MEA prediction
Short run Long run of MEA
Mean 13 16 61 48
Min 0 5 5
Max 108 240 145
Std. Dev. 20 49 32
Tables 1.11 to 1.14 summarize the quantitative eﬀects of INVEST LIBERAL again for the
year 2006. Notice that – similar to TRADE LIBERAL – the impact of INVEST LIBERAL
on MEA participation will be large in 2006 compared to 1960, since the number of BITs
in place by 2006 is larger than the years before. There are again four tables summarizing
the eﬀects for EU, NAFTA, ROW, and WORLD. As explained above the last two columns
report absolute predictions of MEAs concluded with and without INVEST LIBERAL for
the average country (in the top row) in each group considered in 200621. The ﬁrst column
is simply the diﬀerence between the last two columns in each table and represents short-run
– or contemporaneous – eﬀects of INVEST LIBERAL. Introducing all existing INVEST
LIBERAL in 2006 relative to a situation with zero BITs leads to an increase of about 13
MEAs for the average country included (see the upper left number in table 1.14). Similar
to the case of PTAs, the eﬀect of INVEST LIBERAL in absolute terms for countries in
the ROW is well below the one for EU member countries, which is the highest.
Summing up sections 1.6.2 and 1.6.3, results suggest that for the average economy in the
world (see table 1.10 and table 1.14) the number of MEAs ratiﬁed would be predicted to
drop by more than one-ﬁfteenth if all preferential trade agreements would be abandoned,
and by more than one-ﬁfth for the case of bilateral investment treaties. Even though the
21We also report minimum and maximum eﬀects along with the standard deviation of the eﬀects across
the countries in each group.
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nexus between environmental protection and MEA participation is not trivial, we argue
that such a large change in international cooperation in terms of environmental agreements
could bring about detrimental eﬀects for environmental protection.
1.7 Conclusions
This chapter investigates whether preferential liberalizations of trade or investment work
as stepping stones or building blocs to the formation of environmental agreements. While
environmental activists seem to assume the former, we provide evidence supporting the lat-
ter from all multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) which regulate environmental
protection between 1960 and 2006.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the determinants of the number of MEAs a country
participates in. Such an analysis should respect two features of the data on MEAs. First,
the number of MEAs a country is a member of is a discrete variable, a count. Second, MEA
participation at the country level is a rather persistent phenomenon and calls for dynamic
analysis. Accordingly, we base our inference on a dynamic (linear feedback) model for count
data by Blundell, Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002). The obtained parameter estimates are
used to assess the impact of trade and investment liberalization in the short run and the
long run for all 105 countries in our sample (the world) and groups thereof.
The ﬁndings strongly support the view that both trade and investment liberalization stim-
ulate MEA participation. Economically large countries and, especially, ones with many
preferential trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties in place are more likely to
ratify MEAs. Across country groups, their impact on MEA membership is strongest for
the member countries of the European Union and it is weakest for (mostly least developed)
countries in the rest of the world.
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Appendix - Chapter 1
1.A.1 Econometric Model
A complication in estimating the econometric model arises as the within group mean
scaling estimator will be inconsistent for small 푇 , since the lagged dependent variable is
predetermined 22. For estimation by the generalized method of moments (GMM), the LFM
may be quasi-diﬀerenced (see Wooldridge, 1997) with
푞푖푡 =
푦푖푡 −
∑푝
푗=1 훾푗푦푖푡−푗
휇푖푡
− 푦푖푡−1 −
∑푝
푗=1 훾푗푦푖푡−1−푗
휇푖푡−1
. (1.5)
The quasi-diﬀerencing transformation following Wooldridge (1997) has the advantage that
it can deal with potentially endogenous regressors. Regressors are endogenous when
퐸(푥푖푡푢푖푡) ∕= 0. Hence, for endogenous 푥푖푡, the following moment conditions are valid:
퐸(푞푖푡∣푦푖푡−2, 푥푖푡−2) = 0.
Deﬁne 휃 = [훾1, . . . , 훾푝, 훽]
′. Then, the GMM estimator minimizes
휃 = arg min
{(
1
푁
푁∑
푖=1
푞′푖푍푖
)
푊푁
(
1
푁
푁∑
푖=1
푞′푖푍푖
)}
, (1.6)
where 푞푖 is the 푇 − 푝− 1 vector [푞푖푡], 푍푖 is the matrix of instruments and 푊푁 is a weights
matrix. We use the full set of sequential instruments so that 푍푖 is given by:
푍푖 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
푦푖1 푥푖1 푥푖2
. . .
푦푖1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푦푖푇−2 푥푖1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푥푖푇−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (1.7)
22I.e., it is correlated with shocks in the past so that 퐸(푥푖푡푢푖푡+푗) = 0, j⩾ 0, and 퐸(푥푖푡푢푖푡−푠) ∕= 0, s⩾ 1.
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The eﬃcient weights matrix for the moments is deﬁned as
푊푁(휃ˆ1) =
(
1
푁
푁∑
푖=1
푍 ′푖푞푖(휃ˆ1)푞푖(휃ˆ1)
′푍푖
)−1
. (1.8)
The one-step GMM estimator 휃ˆ1 uses 푊푁 =
(
1
푁
∑푁
푖=1 푍
′
푖푍푖
)−1
as the initial weights matrix.
The asymptotic variance of 휃ˆ1 may be computed as
vˆar(휃ˆ1) =
1
푁
(
퐶(휃ˆ1)
′푊푁퐶(휃ˆ1)
)−1
푊푁푊
−1
푁 (휃ˆ1)푊푁퐶(휃ˆ1)
(
퐶(휃ˆ1)
′푊푁퐶(휃ˆ1)
)−1
, (1.9)
where
퐶(휃ˆ1) =
1
푁
푁∑
푖=1
∂푍 ′푖푞푖(휃)
∂휃
∣∣∣∣
휃ˆ1
. (1.10)
The eﬃcient two-step GMM estimator 휃ˆ2 uses the eﬃcient weights matrix 푊푁(휃ˆ1), where
푞푖(휃ˆ1) is based on the one-step estimates 휃ˆ1. The asymptotic variance of the eﬃcient two-
step GMM estimator is computed as
vˆar(휃ˆ2) =
1
푁
(
퐶(휃ˆ2)
′푊푁퐶(휃ˆ2)
)−1
. (1.11)
Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996) suggest to directly account for the dependence of 푊푁
on 휃 in the optimization, an estimator known as the continuous updating GMM estimator
in the literature. The main advantage of the latter estimator is that it is invariant to
curvature altering transformations of the population moment conditions (see Hall, 2005).
Because of the small sample bias of the two-step GMM estimator (see Windmeijer, 2002),
we additionally use a ﬁnite sample correction based on block-bootstrapping. In order to
preserve the time-structure of the data, we construct our bootstrap samples by drawing
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from the pool of 105 countries 2000 times with replacement, and then take for every drawn
country all observations over time. We then calculate the mean and standard observations
over the 2000 bootstraps for every estimated coeﬃcient, leading to our estimates for the
block-bootstrap. As the draws are taken from the sample, the ﬁnite-sample properties of
our sample are preserved for the bootstrapped standard areas. For more details on the
properties of the bootstrap method see for example Chapter 11 in Cameron and Trivedi
(2005).
1.A.2 Multilateral resistance terms
Even though multilateral resistance terms are unobserved, they can be obtained as solutions
to the system of nonlinear equations of the form
Π1−휎푖푡 =
푁∑
푗=1
(
푃 휎−1푗푡 휃푗푡푡
1−휎
푖푗푡
) ∀ 푖, 푡, 휃푗푡 = 푦푗푡
푦푊푡
∀ 푗, 푡, (1.12)
푃 1−휎푗푡 =
푁∑
푖=1
(
Π휎−1푖푡 휃푖푡푡
1−휎
푖푗푡
) ∀ 푗, 푡, 휃푖푡 = 푦푖푡
푦푊푡
∀ 푖, 푡. (1.13)
To solve for Π1−휎푖푡 and 푃
1−휎
푗푡 , we only need to know nominal GDPs and bilateral economic
trade costs. However, while GDPs may be directly gathered from statistical sources, this
is impossible for economic trade costs. Typically, trade economists model them as 푡푖푗푡 ≡
푒z
′
푖푗푡휷, where z푖푗푡 is a vector of observable trade barrier variables and 휷 is a corresponding
vector of unobservable (but estimable) parameters relating the elements of z푖푗푡 to 푡푖푗푡.
Speciﬁcally, we use the following observable variables as elements of z푖푗푡: bilateral geo-
graphical distance between countries 푖 and 푗; an indicator of contiguity of countries 푖 and
푗 which is unity if two countries have a common land border and zero else; a common
language indicator which is unity if countries 푖 and 푗 have a common oﬃcial language and
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zero else; a continent dummy which is unity if two countries are located at the same con-
tinent; a colony indicator which is unity if two countries had a colonial relationship in the
past; a current colony indicator which is unity if two countries had a colonial relationship
after World War II; an indicator which is unity if the two units 푖 and 푗 form one country
(such as Denmark and Greenland); and a preferential trade agreement indicator which is
unity if two countries belong to such an agreement in a given year 23. All variables except
for preferential trade agreement memberships are time-invariant and collected from the ge-
ographical data set made available by the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et Internationales
(CEPII). We estimate the parameters 휷 by means of a cross-sectional regression model
based on data of the year 2006.
Potential trade ﬂows are deﬁned as the model predictions using equations (1.1) and (1.12)
and estimates of the parameters 휷 from a cross-sectional model cum ﬁxed country eﬀects
for the year 2006. Notice that neighboring countries’ weighted GDP and population ex-
hibit time variation for two reasons: First, GDP and population change over time and so
does weighted GDP and population; second, potential trade weights change since GDPs
change, preferential trade agreement membership changes, and, indirectly, the multilateral
resistance terms in (1.12) change through GDP and preferential trade agreement member-
ships.
23We use information on preferential trade agreements as notiﬁed to the World Trade Organization.
These data are augmented and corrected by using information from the CIA’s World Fact Book and
preferential trade agreement secretariat web-sites.
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Abstract∗
Diﬀerent countries making common decisions on environmental policy and environmen-
tal regulation are the focus of multilateral environmental agreements (MEA). Whereas
economic and political inﬂuences on MEAs have already been investigated, the level and
direction of impacts by environmental determinants still remain unclear. As MEAs diﬀer
in their issue-area we classify the agreements with 5 clusters (biodiversity; atmosphere;
land; chemicals and hazardous wastes; seas)† and estimate cluster speciﬁc environmental
inﬂuences on the number of MEAs of a cluster. Additionally we analyze economic and po-
litical impacts and estimate bilateral eﬀects between the clusters. It is this chapter’s focus
to shed light on the diﬀerent pace of economic, political, and environmental determinants
on environmental agreement participation as well as on mutual impacts of MEA clusters
by means of a dynamic count data model for the number of MEAs of diﬀerent clusters
ratiﬁed at the country level.
2.1 Introduction
“The interconnectedness of the global environment is beyond dis-
pute. [...]coordinated international action is essential to protecting
Earth’s climate, preserving its biodiversity, and managing its
marine and other common resources.” (World Resources Institute,
International Environmental Governance, 2002, Chapter 7, p. 137)
Trade and environment intersect in many diﬀerent ways. A common assumption might be
that strict environmental policy reduces trade ﬂows in and out of the considered country.
But Tobey’s (1990) results were the ﬁrst to cast serious doubt on the balance of trade
argument against the imposition of stronger environmental control. In his empirical work
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Peter Egger and Mario Larch.
†Analogous to the multilateral environmental agreements clusters of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP, 2001).
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he found that strict environmental policy has no measurable eﬀect on the trade ﬂows of
heavily polluting industries. Later many other scientiﬁc approaches (among others see van
Beers and van den Bergh, 1997 and 2000) were able to aﬃrm his doubts empirically as well.
So there should not be an economic threat for a country to introduce a strict environmental
framework. Concerning the global threat of a progressing climate change and its dangers
for the society, economy and environment the question arises: If strict environmental
policy does not reduce trade ﬂows, which are the determinants that can enhance strict
environmental policy globally? It is obvious that global environmental policy needs global
arrangements, namely multilateral environmental agreements (MEA). Due to this, we try
to shed light on the most important economic, political, and environmental determinants
and its impacts on MEAs to give an econometric answer to the above question.
As environmental pollution typically does not stop at the border it can have global impact
or at least greater regional impact aﬀecting more than two countries. For this purpose
multilateral environmental agreements are instruments with which several countries can
cooperate in environmental protection issues and which are governed by international law.
Upon several countries have signed such an agreement it can become binding if they ratify
it as well. But according to Ron Mitchell’s statement, that “the empirical basis for claims
regarding the number of such agreements and their characteristics remain weak” (Mitchell,
2003, p. 431) we try to close this gap with a count data model approach and diﬀerent
economic, political, and environmental determinants. Furthermore we seize the fact that
MEAs are diverse in nature and thus need to be divided into clusters covering diﬀerent
environmental issues. Following the UNEP MEA Clusters1 we make use of 5 clusters: bio-
diversity, atmosphere, land, chemicals and hazardous wastes, and seas. Besides the impacts
of economic and political determinants on a country’s decision to ratify MEAs we also fo-
cus on bilateral cluster speciﬁc impacts on the number of MEAs of another cluster. Our
1cf. multilateral environmental agreements clusters of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP, 2001).
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analysis shows that not all clusters inﬂuence each other. Even though the bilateral eﬀects
are positive throughout, some are insigniﬁcant. For example land related MEAs have no
eﬀect on other clusters but the biodiversity one. On the other side MEAs classiﬁed with
chemicals and hazardous wastes are highly reactive in terms of bilaterally stimulating a
country to ratify MEAs of another cluster.
This chapter is organized as follows. By hands of ﬁve maps of the diﬀerent MEA clusters
we ﬁrstly show interesting insights that can be learned from a graphical study. After
describing the applied econometric model from Blundell, Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002)
we depict in the next section which variables will be used for our regressions and divide
them into three key categories of exogenous inﬂuences. In section 2.5 we carefully examine
our regression results with diﬀerent settings of lagged dependent variables for the linear
feedback model and ﬁnally we conclude.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
The following maps show the distribution of the number of MEAs of all countries in the
world ratiﬁed until 2006. This MEA data is composed of two sources. First we started
with data from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN),
Data-base from Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC)2. Then by courtesy
of Ron Mitchell3 we were able to widen and to round out the CIESIN SEDAC data set
in more recent years up to 2006. In order to be able to compare the maps visually we
apply a mathematical rule to categorize the countries’ number of MEAs into the respective
2see Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) (2006).
3see Mitchell (2007).
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color. Using the 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, and 80-100 quantiles, the dark red and red
colored countries have ratiﬁed less than the median number of MEAs. Counties around
the median number of MEAs are yellow and all countries with a higher and the highest
number of MEAs are colored in green and dark green, respectively. This is true for all the
ﬁve maps representing the number of MEAs in 2006 of the clusters biodiversity, atmosphere,
land, chemicals and hazardous wastes, and seas.
Figure 2.1: The number of multilateral environmental agreements in 2006 - Cluster:
Biodiversity
Looking at the key of all ﬁve maps the great diﬀerence in the maximum number of MEAs,
and also in the median number of MEAs, between the clusters is clearly to see. Agreements
related to the cluster land reach only to a maximum of 21, but there is at least one
country which ratiﬁed up to 94 MEAs in terms of the cluster seas. Looking at every cluster
separately in the cluster biodiversity, both France and Sweden ratiﬁed the most MEAs until
2006. Whereas Germany and Luxembourg are the ones which have the highest number
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Figure 2.2: The number of multilateral environmental agreements in 2006 - Cluster:
Atmosphere
Figure 2.3: The number of multilateral environmental agreements in 2006 - Cluster: Land
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Figure 2.4: The number of multilateral environmental agreements in 2006 - Cluster:
Chemicals and hazardous wastes
Figure 2.5: The number of multilateral environmental agreements in 2006 - Cluster: Seas
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of MEAs in the atmosphere cluster. Germany has also ratiﬁed the most MEAs in the
clusters land and chemicals and hazardous wastes. Then, in the cluster seas again France
is the country that shows the highest number of MEAs in 2006. Another interesting aspect
is that besides the European countries the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, India,
Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Egypt, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru are always
to ﬁnd in the top group of countries (green or dark green). The dominating role of Europe
is still obvious but the environmental eﬀort of these countries in terms of ratifying MEAs
in all diﬀerent clusters is remarkable.
2.3 Econometric model
The count of a country’s ratiﬁcation of MEAs over time display strong persistence. For
every country and in every year, the number of MEAs a country participates in follows a
quite nice MA(1) term with slowly decreasing correlation over time and a sharp decline
in partial autocorrelation after a high value in the ﬁrst period. This is true regarding all
MEAs unclassiﬁed as well as a speciﬁc MEA cluster. Hence, a country’s MEA history
should deﬁnitely be used for explaining the current number of MEAs of a country by
including a lagged dependent variable in the econometric model while solving for resulting
endogeneity. Due to this, we apply Blundell, Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002) to model the
dynamics of the number of MEAs a country ratiﬁes as a dynamic linear feedback model
(LFM). This means, we make use of the feedback information of lagged values of the
dependent variable. Here the conditional mean of a dependent count variable is assumed
to be linear in the history of the process.4
4see also Windmeijer (2008).
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The conditional mean in the standard LFM is deﬁned as
퐸 (푦푖푡∣푦푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖) = 훾푦푖푡−1 + 푒푥푝 (푥′푖푡훽) 푣푖 (2.1)
= 훾푦푖푡−1 + 휇푖푡휈푖,
where 푦푖푡 denotes the number of MEAs country 푖, 푖 = 1, ..., 푁 , has ratiﬁed in year 푡,
푡 = 1, ..., 푇 . 푥푖푡 represents a vector of 퐾 explanatory variables and 휈푖 ≡ 푒푥푝(휂푖) is a
permanent scaling factor for the individual speciﬁc mean. The parameters 훾 and 훽 are to
be estimated. As the number of MEAs is predetermined, i.e., correlated with past shocks
but not current ones,
퐸 (푥푖푡푢푖푡+푗) = 0, 푗 ≥ 0,
퐸 (푥푖푡푢푖푡−푠) = 0, 푠 ≥ 1,
we can instrument the contemporaneous values with its second lags and thus solve the
endogeneity problem. According to Windmeijer (2008) the LFM can also be motivated
as an entry-exit process with the probability of exit equal to (1− 훾). Moreover the mean
value for 푦푖푡 is bounded below by 훾푦푖푡−1 as 휇푖푡휈푖 is non-negative.
In a second step, to imply the eﬀects of clusters on each other, we extend the LFM using
the superscript 푐 for cluster.
퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
= 훾푦푐푖푡−1 + 휏푦
퐶 ∕=푐
푖푡−1 + 푒푥푝 (푥
′
푖푡훽) 푣푖 (2.2)
= 훾푦푐푖푡−1 + 휏푦
퐶 ∕=푐
푖푡−1 + 휇푖푡휈푖
Here, the parameter 휏 is to be estimated additionally. It measures the impact of the lagged
number of MEAs of all other clusters or the bilateral impact of the lagged number of MEAs
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of one other cluster.
We compared diﬀerent estimation methods where it turned out that, in context of MEAs,
the results of the one-step estimator using Wooldridge moment conditions should be applied
instead of other generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. Corresponding to the
indication by Windmeijer (2002) we found out that the eﬃcient two-step GMM estimator
which uses the estimates from the one-step estimator for the moments weighting matrix
and the continuously updated GMM estimator that directly accounts for the dependence of
the moments weighting matrix on the parameters in the optimization (see Hansen, Heaton,
and Yaron, 1996) could be severely downward biased because of our small sample, i.e., the
small 푁 . And using a ﬁnite sample correction with block-bootstrapping in order to solve
for the small sample bias could only reproduce the one-step estimator results (cf. chapter
1).
2.4 Determinants of ratifying MEAs
Many excellent theoretical papers analyze environmental agreements by use of stylized
emission abatement costs and beneﬁts or climate change damage costs and side payments.
Others apply a payoﬀ share of the public good ”clean environment” (among many others
see Barrett, 1994; Barrett, Stavins, 2003; Carraro, Eyckmans, Finus, 2006; Finus, Rund-
shagen, 1998a, 1998b; Lange, Vogt, 2002). However, costs and side payments as well as
payoﬀ shares are hard to measure. Hence, in our empirical investigation we rely on more
fundamental variables, such as economic, environmental, and political determinants, that
are likely to be correlated with costs and side payments as well as payoﬀ shares and there-
fore determine the decision to join or form a MEA. Table 2.1 lists the variables that are
used to capture the most important impacts on MEAs.
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Table 2.1: Statistics of balanced data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
YEAR 5170 1983 13.5660 1960 2006
NUMBER OF MEAs 5170 32.2445 34.4753 0 212
CLUSTER BIODIVERSITY 5170 4.0178 4.4381 0 27
CLUSTER ATMOSPHERE 5170 3.8143 5.4397 0 30
CLUSTER LAND 5170 2.8845 2.7611 0 21
CLUSTER CHEMICALS 5170 8.5178 8.5266 0 48
CLUSTER SEAS 5170 12.9727 15.3181 0 94
CLUSTER ∕= BIODIVERSITY 5170 28.2267 30.3859 0 185
CLUSTER ∕= ATMOSPHERE 5170 28.4302 29.6939 0 186
CLUSTER ∕= LAND 5170 29.3226 32.1034 0 195
CLUSTER ∕= CHEMICALS 5170 23.72669 26.3782 0 164
CLUSTER ∕= SEAS 5170 19.2718 19.9618 0 123
Economic determinants:
LGDP 5170 23.5477 2.1554 17.8967 30.0656
LPOP 5170 9.3292 1.4516 6.2086 14.0895
TRADE LIBERAL 5170 1.4270 1.8332 -4.1154 5.2542
INVEST LIBERAL 5170 9.6680 18.5627 0 131
LDC 5170 0.1818 0.3857 0 1
Political determinants:
PFI 5170 4.9579 1.9583 1 9.6
Environmental determinants:
PLANT SPECIES 5170 52.8575 111.4035 0 683
AGRRAW 5170 9.4035 13.1677 0 88.7417
CO2 EMISSIONS 5170 3.6872 4.4801 -0.0197 27.7664
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2.4.1 Economic determinants
The number of multilateral environmental agreements and the number of MEAs of the
diﬀerent clusters are applied as described above in section 2.2. For example the variable
CLUSTER BIODIVERSITY contains the country speciﬁc and yearly number of MEAs
related to biodiversity. Whereas CLUSTER ∕= BIODIVERSITY includes the number of all
other MEAs but biodiversity MEAs, i.e., the country speciﬁc and yearly number of MEAs
classiﬁed with atmosphere, land, chemicals and hazardous wastes, and seas.
To account for size and economic weight of a country we use population together with
real gross domestic product (GDP) data from Maddison’s (2003) historical time-series
and extrapolate GDP and population data for more recent years by using indices of the
growth of GDP at real U.S. dollars and of the population from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators 2008, respectively. We include log population and log GDP in our
empirical model which refer to the acronyms LPOP and LGDP in our tables.
Additionally we include the two economic determinants TRADE LIBERAL and INVEST
LIBERAL to our study. INVEST LIBERAL is a measure of a country’s investment lib-
eralization that simply reﬂects the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of a
country. And TRADE LIBERAL measures the importance of bilateral and multilateral
trade costs, among others through preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership, to
account for direct and indirect consequences of trade costs. In a nutshell TRADE LIB-
ERAL represents the trade liberalization of a country, i.e., the inverse of its trade costs5.
Similar to LGDP and LPOP we use the log of these inverted trade costs for TRADE
LIBERAL. Because TRADE LIBERAL or INVEST LIBERAL may be endogenous, we
apply Wooldridge’s quasi-diﬀerencing transformation. This GMM estimator has the ad-
5For more details on TRADE LIBERAL and INVEST LIBERAL see chapter 1, Anderson (1979), and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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vantage that it can deal with potentially endogenous regressors where 퐸(푥푖푡푢푖푡) ∕= 0 by
using 퐸(푞푖푡∣푦푖푡−2, 푥푖푡−2) = 0 as a valid moment condition6.
Finally we include a binary variable for least developed countries (LDC) to spot linkages
between the number of MEAs and the development status of a country. This LDC variable
is constructed employing data of the United Nations Oﬃce of the High Representative
for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island
Developing States (UN-OHRLLS).
2.4.2 Political determinants
To measure the inﬂuence of countries’ institutions on MEA membership we apply an index
of political freedom (PFI) which is constructed by the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney,
Lawson, Sobel, and Leeson, 2007) and which ranges from 1 to 10. For example this index
rates the legal structure and security of property rights as well as the access to sound money
in a country. The higher the index, the greater the political freedom in that country.
2.4.3 Environmental determinants
Finally, we include three environmental determinants that are supposed to represent the
most important environmental impact in the diﬀerent MEA clusters.
6cf. Wooldridge (1997).
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Cluster: Biodiversity
According to the Environmental Performance Index7 of Yale and Columbia Universities
two indicators are used representing biodiversity of a country: marine protected area and
critical habitat protection. To capture comparable inﬂuences of critical habitat protection
we apply threatened plant species (labeled as PLANT SPECIES) from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators 2008 and extrapolate them for missing years. Unfortunately
marine protected area is only available at one point in time and hence not usable for our
quasi-diﬀerencing model approach. Interestingly the highest number of threatened plant
species shows Malaysia in 2004, i.e. 683 threatened plant species, whereas 51% of the
observed countries display less than 5 threatened plant species.
Cluster: Atmosphere
Obviously, the most interesting aspect to observe here are CO2 emissions. From the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008 we make use of CO2 emissions, labeled as CO2
EMISSIONS. We also experimented with CO2 emissions per capita and CO2 emissions per
GDP but their results in the 훽 parameters did not diﬀer to those of the total CO2 emissions
of a country with respect to the inﬂuence on ratifying MEAs as we already measure GDP
and population eﬀects with LGDP and LPOP. In 1968 Senegal is the only country which
reports a negative CO2 EMISSIONS value. In all other years its emissions are positive.
And it is no wonder that China shows the highest CO2 EMISSIONS value ever in 2006.
7see E. C. Daniel, M. Levy, C. Kim, A. de Sherbinin, T. Srebotnjak, and V. Mara (2008).
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Cluster: Land
As a land related environmental determinant we apply agricultural raw materials in %
of merchandize exports from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. This
variable (AGRRAW) ranges from 0% to 88.74%, with an average of 9.4%. In our data Nepal
and Singapore have the highest percentage rate of agricultural raw materials in 1960, while
Burkina Faso, Benin, and the Central African Republic have the highest percentage shares
in 2006. We also experimented with land area (in percent of total land area), the forest
area of a country (in percent of total land area or in square kilometers), and a country’s
permanent cropland (in percent of total land area), but these variables are highly collinear
with the included covariates (such as CO2 EMISSIONS or PLANT SPECIES).
Cluster: Chemicals and hazardous wastes
To ﬁlter out a speciﬁc impact on environmental agreements inside the chemicals and haz-
ardous wastes cluster we also apply CO2 EMISSIONS. Unfortunately we did not ﬁnd data
of adequate many countries to measure a country’s investments in recycling technology
or recycling expenses, which we initially planed to use. But CO2 EMISSIONS capture at
least some aspects of chemicals and hazardous wastes speciﬁc multilateral environmental
agreements as these agreements ﬁrst of all refer to cleaner production and thus partly to
lowering CO2 emissions.
Cluster: Seas
Most MEAs in this cluster are multi-sectoral agreements based on precautionary and pre-
ventive approaches. With regard to ﬁshing agreements, regression results of any environ-
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mental determinants should be a lot like the results computed for the biodiversity cluster.
Due to this, we make use of the number of threatened plant species (PLANT SPECIES)
as well as agricultural raw materials in % of merchandize exports (AGRRAW). Unfortu-
nately we did not ﬁnd easy accessible and keen data of ﬁshing quantities which we initially
preferred to apply, too. But PLANT SPECIES and AGRRAW capture also submarine
threatened plant species and submarine agricultural raw materials like ﬁshes. Thus, they
should capture seas related environmental inﬂuences like CO2 EMISSIONS do in the case
of the chemicals and hazardous wastes cluster.
The data of the above mentioned determinants of MEA participation is not available
for all 199 countries that are in our MEA data. As the applied LFM model dictates to
use balanced data for estimations, we need to drop some countries and remain with 110
economies (see table 2.1) of which 20 are LDCs according to the UN-OHRLLS8 deﬁnition.
The subsequent regression results are based on these 110 economies.
2.5 Results
The results in table 2.2 serve as an overview to the following tables (tables 2.3 to 2.7).
Within this table it is easy to compare the impacts of the diﬀerent lagged dependent
variables of the MEA clusters with a benchmark in the ﬁrst column (representing the
results for all MEAs unclassiﬁed). Likewise, the beneﬁt of this table is to be able to
compare visually more comfortably the diﬀerent impacts of the exogenous variables on the
ﬁve MEA clusters.
8United Nations Oﬃce of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States.
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Frist of all the direction of a speciﬁc determinant’s eﬀect, except the occasional one, is
always the same: Lagged dependent variables, economic determinants, and political de-
terminants aﬀect the number of MEAs beneﬁcial, whereas environmental determinants,
if they are signiﬁcant, have a negative impact on the number of MEAs. Coeﬃcients of
LGDP and TRADE LIBERAL are large, positive, and signiﬁcant for all MEA clusters.
Only the setting with agreements related to land display smaller eﬀects and a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for TRADE LIBERAL only at the 10% signiﬁcance level. For all other explanatory
variables impacts vary between the MEA clusters. An interesting aspect is that for the
clusters biodiversity and land the lagged dependent variable, i.e., the lagged number of
MEAs inside the regarded cluster, has no signiﬁcant impact on the number of MEAs of
that cluster. This means, a country’s history of MEAs related to biodiversity or land has
no measurable notably impact on ratifying an additional biodiversity MEA or land MEA,
respectively. But the number of all other MEAs very well has a positive signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the respective number of MEAs. It seems like the eﬀect of the lagged number of
MEAs of the own cluster is compensated by a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect of LDC for the
biodiversity cluster and by LPOP for the land cluster. Moreover, LDC has a signiﬁcant
impact only in the setting of all MEAs unclassiﬁed and MEAs related to biodiversity (see
LDC in column 1 and 2 in table 2.2). Likewise, LPOP is positive and signiﬁcant only in
the regressions of atmosphere and land related MEAs (see LPOP in column 3 and 4 in
table 2.2). This means, if a country is more densely populated it is more likely to ratify
another MEA classiﬁed with land or atmosphere, and if a country is leased developed it is
more likely to ratify another biodiversity MEA. Another interesting aspect of the lagged
dependent variables is that MEAs classiﬁed with chemicals and hazardous wastes or seas
are stimulated 10 times more by their own past number of MEAs than by the number
of agreements in other environmental areas. For the cluster atmosphere this discrepancy
is even higher. It may reﬂect the higher growth rates in these clusters including the fact
that the time-dependent course of their cluster speciﬁc number of MEAs is diﬀerent to
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time-dependent course of the number of MEAs of all other clusters but the regarded one.
To re´sume´, the linear feedback of either the number of MEAs of the own cluster or the
number of MEAs of the other clusters or both is apparent.
The signiﬁcant positive impact of PFI in the setting with all MEAs and in the setting
with atmosphere related MEAs and seas related MEAs is conformably to the results of
Congleton (1992) and Neumayer (2002) who found a positive systematical impact of po-
litical institutions on environmental regulations. But this seems not to be the case for
the chemicals and hazardous wastes cluster. Here the sign of the impact of PFI changes
while the eﬀect still remains signiﬁcant (see PFI in column 5 in table 2.2). One interpre-
tation might be the more democratic a country is organized the less active it is in terms of
ratifying environmental agreements with respect to chemicals and hazardous wastes. This
ﬁts to the observation that only the leading countries of the world – which are mostly
democratic – have access to nuclear power, thus, produce hazardous waste, and of course
dislike to ratify agreements which may adjust these waste costs intensively. In the same
fashion (as the impact of PFI is reversed in the cluster chemicals and hazardous wastes)
the sign of INVEST LIBERAL switches in the cluster seas (see INVEST LIBERAL in the
last column in table 2.2). Treaties to invest bilaterally may be beneﬁcial to raise assets
from other countries and to cooperate at a non-economic level, such as with environmental
agreements in general (see Rose and Spiegel, 2009), but they also seem to be unfavorable
for speciﬁc environmental agreements, i.e., MEAs classiﬁed with seas. The precautionary
and preventive approach of such an environmental agreement seems to stand in contrast to
a country’s bilateral investment purposes. But the political freedom seem to be an impor-
tant driver for these MEAs, as PFI shows the highes coeﬃcient in the cluster seas. Another
result stepping out of the line are CO2 EMISSIONS. In the cluster atmosphere their eﬀect
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level but switches to a positive sign (see CO2 EMISSIONS in col-
umn 3 in table 2.2). Contrary to the interpretation that democratic countries may prefer
not to ratify costly environmental agreements related to chemicals and hazardous wastes
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(see above), in the case of MEAs classiﬁed with atmosphere the level of CO2 EMISSIONS
plays a favorable role to encourage environmental agreement ratiﬁcation. This indicates
that CO2 EMISSIONS, and climate change in particular, makes for a global concern many
countries pay attention to and hence want to agree on multilaterally. The negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀects of PLANT SPECIES and AGRRAW on the total number of MEAs, the
number of MEAs of the cluster biodiversity, and the number of MEAs related to seas is
very reasonable: The higher the number of threatened plant species the less likely a coun-
try ratiﬁes a multilateral environmental agreement with respect to this topic. This may
reﬂect again a country’s kind of cost avoidance as it is often the case with voluntary envi-
ronmental agreements. Likewise, agricultural raw materials (in % of merchandize exports)
indicates a country’s dependency to agricultural products, and according to this to fertile
plains, which stands in contrast to natural abundant biodiversity or animal-rich and not
nitrate poisoned rivers near farmlands.
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Table 2.2: Parameter estimates with 퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
Number
of MEAs
Bio-
diversity
Atmo-
sphere
Land Chemicals Seas
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴푖푡−1 0.1594
∗∗∗
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0058
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0122
∗∗∗
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.3833
∗∗∗
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.0115
∗∗∗
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0264
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0020
∗∗∗
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0671
∗∗∗
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0073
∗∗∗
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0899
∗∗∗
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0099
∗∗∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.8490
∗∗∗ 0.5164∗∗∗ 0.4507∗∗∗ 0.1775∗∗∗ 0.6899∗∗∗ 0.5556∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 0.0901 0.0616 0.1053
∗∗ 0.2521∗∗ -0.0397 0.1139
TRADE
LIBERAL푖푡
0.6701∗∗∗ 0.4062∗∗∗ 0.5504∗∗∗ 0.1756∗ 0.5507∗∗∗ 0.3960∗∗∗
INVEST
LIBERAL푖푡
0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0011 0.0008 0.0019∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0061∗∗∗
LDC푖푡 0.8518
∗ 0.7493∗∗ 0.0600 -0.0495 0.0169 -0.0410
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0620
∗∗∗ 0.0173 0.0325∗ -0.0013 -0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0833∗∗∗
Environmental determinants:
PLANT
SPECIES푖푡
-0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0014∗∗∗
AGRRAW푖푡 -0.0180
∗∗∗ -0.0088∗∗ -0.0079 0.0017 -0.0041 -0.0185∗∗∗
CO2
EMISSIONS푖푡
-0.0117 -0.0163 0.0495∗∗ -0.0082∗ -0.0298∗∗ 0.0044
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 110 countries and 5,170 observations in all six ONE
STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006. Once and twice
lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are used as instruments (i.e.,
values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
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For a closer look to the interactions between the ﬁve MEA clusters we ran serval regressions
and exchanged the additional lagged dependent variable, i.e., additional to the lagged
number of MEAs of the observed cluster, by the number of MEAs of another (or all other)
MEA cluster(s). With this approach we try to ﬁlter out the bilateral impacts of diﬀerent
clusters of multilateral environmental agreements. For convenience we include in tables
2.3 to 2.7 the regression results of the lagged number of all other MEAs but the observed
one as the additional lagged dependent variable you already know from table 2.2.
Cluster: Biodiversity
In table 2.3 the phenomenon of an insigniﬁcant impact of the lagged number of MEAs
of the observed cluster, here biodiversity, is readily identiﬁable. An interesting fact is
that even though the lagged number of biodiversity MEAs does not inﬂuence the current
number of biodiversity MEAs the number of MEAs of all other clusters does. The most
considerable impact of a lagged dependent variable on the number of MEAs classiﬁed with
biodiversity comes from the land and the chemicals and hazardous wastes cluster, of which
the impact of chemicals and hazardous wastes MEAs is actually highly signiﬁcant (see
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 in column 4 in table 2.3). As the other coeﬃcients of column 4 are nearly
equal to the ones of column 1 (except for PFI) the feedback of the lagged number of MEAs
related to chemicals and hazardous wastes seems to be the main driver of the results in
the setting with all MEAs but the observed one (see table 2.3, column 1 and 4). In both
cases the number of bilateral investment treaties (INVEST LIBERAL) does not play any
role for a country’s decision to ratify biodiversity MEAs. The major impacts of economic
determinants come from LGDP, TRADE LIBERAL, and LDC. Please remember that
only in the biodiversity cluster LDC has a signiﬁcant impact (cf. table 2.2) on ratifying
biodiversity MEAs. Here, in table 2.3, this result is even robust to all diﬀerent settings (cf.
LDC in table 2.3 in columns 1 to 5). Robust impacts also become apparent for PLANT
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SPECIES and AGRRAW. Independent of controlling for another MEA cluster, these two
environmental determinants aﬀect a country’s decision to ratify another biodiversity MEA
adversely. As stated above these negative eﬀects are very plausible.
Cluster: Atmosphere
Interactions of lagged atmosphere MEAs and lagged MEAs of other clusters are quite
diﬀerent to those of the biodiversity cluster analyzed afore. In table 2.4 in each column the
impact of the own lagged dependent variable is much higher than the one of another cluster.
MEAs classiﬁed with biodiversity or land are even insigniﬁcant. When these feedback
variables become insigniﬁcant also the impact of LPOP vanishes. Instead of LPOP here
INVEST LIBERAL becomes aﬀective (see LPOP and INVEST LIBERAL in columns 2
and 3 in table 2.4). Only LGDP and TRADE LIBERAL of the economic determinants
are positive and highly signiﬁcant in all regressions. PFI is positive and signiﬁcant in all
settings but the one with biodiversity MEAs as additional lagged dependent variable. Also
CO2 EMISSIONS are positive and signiﬁcant in all cases but in the one with MEAs related
to seas. As already stated above, it seems that countries are aware of their CO2 emissions
and the related global consequences. Thus the level of their CO2 emissions boosts their
probability to ratify MEAs related to atmosphere. The highest bilateral impact on ratifying
an additional atmosphere MEA has the cluster chemicals and hazardous wastes followed by
the seas cluster. An interpretation of the positive eﬀects of 푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 , 푦
퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆
푖푡−1
or 푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 in conjunction with the positive eﬀects of TRADE LIBERAL and LGDP on a
country’s decision to ratify an additional atmosphere MEA can be that MEAs of these three
clusters are the main focus of developed countries and hence inﬂuence each other bilaterally.
Reducing hazardous waste, installing ﬁshing quotas, and ﬁghting global warming seem to
be linked together and to work somehow supportingly to arrange a common environmental
goal with the aid of a multilateral environmental agreement.
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Table 2.3: Parameter estimates with 퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
; 푐 =biodiversity
Bio-
diversity
Bio-
diversity
Bio-
diversity
Bio-
diversity
Bio-
diversity
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0058 0.0138 0.0139 0.0100 0.0129
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0122
∗∗∗
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.0125
∗∗
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0355
∗
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0316
∗∗∗
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0185
∗∗∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.5164
∗∗∗ 0.7391∗∗∗ 0.6095∗∗∗ 0.5637∗∗∗ 0.5471∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 0.0616 0.0414 0.0727 0.0630 0.0544
TRADE LIBERAL푖푡 0.4062
∗∗∗ 0.5231∗∗∗ 0.5211∗∗∗ 0.3952∗∗∗ 0.4459∗∗∗
INVEST LIBERAL푖푡 -0.0011 0.0029
∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.0030∗∗
LDC푖푡 0.7493
∗∗ 0.9797∗∗ 0.9099∗∗ 0.8675∗∗ 0.7793∗∗
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0173 0.0325
∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0125
Environmental determinants:
PLANT SPECIES푖푡 -0.0004
∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0002
AGRRAW푖푡 -0.0088
∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗
CO2 EMISSIONS푖푡 -0.0163 -0.0178 -0.0150 -0.0163 -0.0147
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 110 countries and 5,170 observations in all
six ONE STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006.
Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are used
as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
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Table 2.4: Parameter estimates with 퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
; 푐 =atmosphere
Atmo-
sphere
Atmo-
sphere
Atmo-
sphere
Atmo-
sphere
Atmo-
sphere
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.3833
∗∗∗ 0.4944∗∗∗ 0.5077∗∗∗ 0.4248∗∗∗ 0.3714∗∗∗
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.0115
∗∗∗
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0180
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0168
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0295
∗∗∗
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0266
∗∗∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.4507
∗∗∗ 0.5343∗∗∗ 0.4232∗∗∗ 0.4218∗∗∗ 0.4475∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 0.1053
∗∗ 0.0783 0.0808 0.1252∗∗ 0.0934∗
TRADE LIBERAL푖푡 0.5504
∗∗∗ 0.5491∗∗∗ 0.4710∗∗∗ 0.5045∗∗∗ 0.5582∗∗∗
INVEST LIBERAL푖푡푖푡 0.0008 0.0044
∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0021 0.0011
LDC 0.0600 0.2053 0.1996 0.1238 0.0766
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0325
∗ 0.0371 0.0523∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0310∗
Environmental determinants:
PLANT SPECIES푖푡 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007
∗∗ -0.0006∗ -0.0002
AGRRAW푖푡 -0.0079 -0.0089 -0.0112 -0.0084 -0.0075
CO2 EMISSIONS푖푡 0.0495
∗∗ 0.0589∗∗ 0.0582∗∗ 0.0613∗∗ 0.0399
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 110 countries and 5,170 observations in all
six ONE STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006.
Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are used
as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
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Table 2.5: Parameter estimates with 퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
; 푐 =land
Land Land Land Land Land
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0264 0.0269 0.0263 0.0288 0.0327
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0020
∗∗∗
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0068
∗∗∗
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.0092
∗∗∗
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0046
∗∗
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0016
∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.1775
∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.1988∗∗∗ 0.2282∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 0.2521
∗∗ 0.2321∗∗ 0.2457∗∗∗ 0.2546∗∗ 0.2256∗∗
TRADE LIBERAL푖푡 0.1756
∗ 0.1868∗ 0.1761∗ 0.1778∗ 0.1971∗
INVEST LIBERAL푖푡 0.0019
∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0023∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
LDC푖푡 -0.0495 -0.0119 0.0430 -0.0094 0.0023
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0014 0.0033 0.0013
Environmental determinants:
PLANT SPECIES푖푡 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
∗ -0.0003
AGRRAW푖푡 0.0017 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 0.0012
CO2 EMISSIONS푖푡 -0.0082
∗ -0.0088∗ -0.0088∗∗ -0.0088∗∗ -0.0106∗∗
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 110 countries and 5,170 observations in all
six ONE STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006.
Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are used
as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
Cluster: Land
Similar to the results of the biodiversity cluster in table 2.3 the coeﬃcient of the lagged
dependent variable of the number of MEAs related to land is insigniﬁcant in all settings (see
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푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 in table 2.5). Here bilateral impacts of every other MEA cluster are positive and
signiﬁcant but very small. The highest one show atmosphere related MEAs. This means,
ratifying an environmental agreement classiﬁed with land is more or less a stand alone
action, but cooperating multilaterally with other countries with respect to, for example,
atmospheric environmental concerns encourages a country to additionally agree on a land
related MEA. Likewise interesting is that the size of a country’s population has a positive
impact on such an agreement. Other inﬂuences do not vary much. LGDP, LPOP, TRADE
LIBERAL, INVEST LIBERAL and CO2 EMISSIONS show up nearly in all regressions
with highly signiﬁcant impacts. Surprisingly AGRRAW (agricultural raw materials in %
of merchandize exports) is insigniﬁcant in all regressions. Hence, a country appears not to
bear in mind to protect its area against, for example, desertiﬁcation by ratifying a MEA
related to land even though its exports are highly dependent to agricultural raw materials,
or more general, highly dependent to fertile an wet soils. Here the costs of environmental
protection via a MEA seem to exceed the related saved revenues in exports of agricultural
raw materials.
Cluster: Chemicals and hazardous wastes
Three already mentioned aspects recur in table 2.6. First, in every regression the lagged
dependent variable’s impact of chemicals and hazardous wastes related MEAs is much
greater than the inﬂuence of another cluster’s lagged number of MEAs. Second, the highest
bilateral connection between the chemicals and hazardous wastes cluster and one other
cluster is reﬂected in atmosphere related MEAs, followed by MEAs classiﬁed with seas (see
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 and 푦
푆퐸퐴푆
푖푡−1 in columns 3 and 5 in table 2.6). Third, the clusters biodiversity
and land do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on a country’s probability to ratify another
chemicals and hazardous wastes related MEA. Again the central economic determinants’
impacts come from LGDP and TRADE LIBERAL. New and stable in nearly all regressions
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in table 2.6 is the negative inﬂuence of PFI. As stated above, it may be the case that the
more democratic a country is organized the less likely it will ratify another MEA related to
chemicals and hazardous wastes. Likewise, the coeﬃcient of CO2 EMISSIONS is negative
and signiﬁcant in all regressions. Thus, due to the negative impact of PFI and CO2
EMISSIONS, the awareness of countries (and in particular of more democratic ones) with
respect to CO2 emissions and the corresponding positive impact on ratifying atmosphere
MEAs (see table 2.4) is not true for the chemicals and hazardous wastes cluster.
Cluster: Seas
In table 2.7 you will ﬁnd a very constant inﬂuence of the lagged dependent number of MEAs
related to seas on the ratiﬁcation decision of an additional seas MEA. This inﬂuence is
independent in the supplementary beneﬁcial and signiﬁcant impacts of MEAs classiﬁed
with biodiversity or chemicals and hazardous wastes (see 푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 and 푦
퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆
푖푡−1
in columns 2 and 5 in table 2.7). These results indicate that even though MEAs related
to seas have a bilateral positive and signiﬁcant impact on atmosphere MEAs (see 푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1
in column 5 in table 2.4) this is not the case the other way around (see 푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 in
column 3 in table 2.7). Again the number of land related MEAs has no explanatory power
to a country’s decision to ratify seas MEAs. As PFI inﬂuences the ratiﬁcation decision of
MEAs classiﬁed with seas positively and signiﬁcantly, Congleton’s (1992) and Neumayer’s
(2002) results of a positive systematical impact of political institutions on environmental
regulations is true for this cluster. The number of threatened plant species (PLANT
SPECIES) and agricultural raw materials in % of merchandize exports (AGRRAW) display
a robust and constant inﬂuence on the number of seas MEAs. Both have a negative and
signiﬁcant impact and reﬂect the above mentioned cost avoidance of countries that are
actually in need of environmental protection by seas MEAs, for example, due to their high
number of threatened submarine plant species.
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Table 2.6: Parameter estimates with 퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
; 푐 =chemicals
Chemicals Chemicals Chemicals Chemicals Chemicals
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0671
∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.0723∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0073
∗∗∗
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0060
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.0254
∗∗∗
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0059
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0115
∗∗∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.6899
∗∗∗ 0.7467∗∗∗ 0.7137∗∗∗ 0.7229∗∗∗ 0.7032∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 -0.0397 -0.0287 -0.0275 -0.0292 -0.0382
TRADE LIBERAL푖푡 0.5507
∗∗∗ 0.5827∗∗∗ 0.5443∗∗∗ 0.5705∗∗∗ 0.5735∗∗∗
INVEST LIBERAL푖푡 0.0006 0.0048
∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗
LDC푖푡 0.0169 0.0841 0.0987 0.0756 0.0586
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 -0.0409
∗∗∗ -0.0245∗ -0.0278∗∗ -0.0175 -0.035∗∗∗
Environmental determinants:
PLANT SPECIES푖푡 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
AGRRAW푖푡 -0.0041 -0.0050 -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0042
CO2 EMISSIONS푖푡 -0.0298
∗∗ -0.0261∗ -0.0261∗ -0.0270∗∗ -0.0297∗∗
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 110 countries and 5,170 observations in all
six ONE STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006.
Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are used
as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
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Table 2.7: Parameter estimates with 퐸
(
푦푐푖푡∣푦푐푖푡−1, 푥푖푡, 푣푖
)
; 푐 =seas
Seas Seas Seas Seas Seas
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
(Number
of MEAs)
Lagged dependent variables:
푦푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0899
∗∗∗ 0.0903∗∗∗ 0.0947∗∗∗ 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗
푦푁퐵푀퐸퐴 ∕=푆퐸퐴푆푖푡−1 0.0099
∗∗∗
푦퐵퐼푂퐷퐼푉 퐸푅푆퐼푇푌푖푡−1 0.0303
∗∗∗
푦퐴푇푀푂푆푃퐻퐸푅퐸푖푡−1 0.0072
푦퐿퐴푁퐷푖푡−1 0.0121
푦퐶퐻퐸푀퐼퐶퐴퐿푆푖푡−1 0.0161
∗∗
Economic determinants:
LGDP푖푡 0.5556
∗∗∗ 0.5790∗∗∗ 0.6448∗∗∗ 0.6439∗∗∗ 0.5779∗∗∗
LPOP푖푡 0.1139 0.1283 0.1261 0.1367 0.1245
TRADE LIBERAL푖푡 0.3960
∗∗∗ 0.4274∗∗∗ 0.4634∗∗∗ 0.4896∗∗∗ 0.4099∗∗∗
INVEST LIBERAL푖푡 -0.0061
∗∗∗ -0.0033∗ -0.0023∗ -0.0019 -0.0047∗∗∗
LDC푖푡 -0.0410 -0.0464 0.0501 0.0491 0.0074
Political determinants:
PFI푖푡 0.0833
∗∗∗ 0.0791∗∗∗ 0.0842∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0840∗∗∗
Environmental determinants:
PLANT SPECIES푖푡 -0.0014
∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗
AGRRAW푖푡 -0.0185
∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗
CO2 EMISSIONS푖푡 0.0044 0.0061 0.0088 0.0036 0.0057
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. There are 110 countries and 5,170 observations in all
six ONE STEP regressions. The parameters are estimated over the period 1962-2006.
Once and twice lagged levels of the dependent and the independent variables are used
as instruments (i.e., values of 1960 and 1961 are used as instruments for 1962).
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2.6 Conclusion
Dividing MEAs into ﬁve diﬀerent clusters gives the opportunity for new insights in the
size, eﬀective direction, and signiﬁcance level of regressors and proves that the number of
MEAs without classiﬁcation into diﬀerent clusters can provide a reliable ﬁrst impression
of the impacts of determinants on ratifying MEAs like we did in chapter 1. The advantage
of using the UNEP (2001) deﬁnition of MEA clusters is, on the one hand, that speciﬁc
inﬂuences of environmental determinants can be ﬁltered out, meaning there is a quantiﬁable
and signiﬁcant impact of CO2 emissions, agricultural raw materials (in % of merchandize
exports), and the number of threatened plant species on the ratiﬁcation decision of MEAs.
On the other hand, mutual positive inﬂuences between the MEA clusters can be ﬁgured
out. In this manner MEAs are bilaterally provoking MEAs in other environmental issues.
Interestingly the lagged dependent variable, i.e., the history of a country’s number of MEAs
of the considered cluster, does not always have explanatory power to the current number
of MEAs. This is the case for the clusters biodiversity and land. But here we ﬁnd bilateral
signiﬁcant inﬂuences of the number of MEAs of all other clusters than the regarded one.
All things considered, the positive impacts of LGDP and TRADE LIBERAL dominate all
settings and do not diﬀer much between the number of MEAs without classiﬁcation (see
table 2.2) and among the MEA clusters (see tables 2.3 to 2.7). Due to this, we can intensify
our interpretation of a positive impulse of globalization on the ratiﬁcation of MEAs via
the rising interconnectedness of all countries worldwide. Additionally we can show that
there are further inﬂuences of a global interconnectedness on multilateral environmental
agreements via the mechanism that diﬀerent MEA clusters stimulate each other. Thus, a
global green contagion is apparent with and within multilateral environmental agreements.
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Abstract
Today, reducing CO2 emissions is a global target which nearly all counties in the world pri-
oritize. Some countries have been ratiﬁed up to 30 multilateral environmental agreements
regarding the atmosphere until 2006. This number is surging especially since 1989 after
the ratiﬁcation of the Montreal Protocol. Following the ﬁndings of the inverted U-shaped
Environmental Kuznets Curve and applying a spline model I can show the beneﬁcial im-
pact of the rising number of multilateral environmental agreements on the forecasts of
CO2 emissions until 2050. My results indicate that the number of atmosphere related
multilateral environmental agreements indeed generates an environmental friendly spirit
among global cooperation of reducing CO2 emissions and therefore serves well as a basis
for eﬀective programs to stop climate change.
3.1 Introduction
A post Kyoto Protocol seems to be a preferential solution to climate change and there-
fore to the global disagreements and concerns regarding global warming. But as seen in
Copenhagen at the end of 2009 the world’s government leaders were not able to restart
global cooperation aiming to stop climate change. Due to this, the world is full of hope
a post Kyoto Protocol will be signed at the next meeting in Cancu´n (Mexico) 2010. This
hope is stimulated by the fact that the current US government displays a moral sense
and a much higher awareness to climate change than a decade ago. According to Barac
Obama’s, statement which has been quoted in the press all over the world, ”we have come
a long way, but we have much further to go”1. Even though the USA, as the remaining
only one of the industrialized countries in the world, did not yet ratify the Kyoto Protocol
(cf. Mitchell, 2007), the fact mentioned above encourage people all over the world to hope
for an early global agreement to climate change, i.e., a working post Kyoto Protocol. A
1among others see msnbc.com news services, updated 12/19/2009 7:42:09 AM ET, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/34475636/
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bitter disappointment has been apparent in the press after the 15th UN Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen as it became clear that this time no new agreement could be
signed. Due to this, one need to pose the question whether such a post Kyoto Protocol
is able to aﬀord the huge challenges of global warming and whether this worldwide hope
is appropriate and advisable. My data show that multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) regarding our atmosphere - like the Kyoto Protocol - are measurable beneﬁcial
for the purpose of stopping climate change. Moreover, I can show that the rapidly rising
number of atmosphere related MEAs, with its underlying CO2 emission reduction eﬀorts,
will play an important role in the countries’ CO2 emission behavior until 2050.
The following section describes and evaluates the applied data within an introductive and
descriptive analysis. Section 3.3 outlines the spline model and the corresponding results
I use for the projections of the year-ﬁxed eﬀects and the number of atmosphere MEAs in
section 3.4. Section 3.5 wraps up the projection results of CO2 emissions until 2050 with
and without impacts of multilateral environmental agreements; and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data description and descriptive statistics
Five diﬀerent sources span the data corpus of the four variables I make use of in this chap-
ter: Real gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 2000 US$ from Maddison’s (2003)
historical time-series is extrapolated for missing years by using growth indices at real U.S.
dollars from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. Population data is
also drawn up from these two sources. Comfortably CO2 emissions (in kT CO2) were
downloadable at a single blow from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008.
The underlying number of multilateral environmental agreements is made up of the Center
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for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Data-base from Socioeco-
nomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) (see CIESIN, 2006) and of a dataset by
courtesy of Ron Mitchell (see Mitchell, 2007). To ﬁlter out the atmosphere related MEAs I
make use of the UNEP clusterﬁcation of MEAs (cf. UNEP, 2001). All four variables range
from 1960 to 2006 and capture 160 countries (see table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 7520 1983 13.5660 1960 2006
GDP (bn) 7520 143.3 637.2 0.036 11,410
Population (m) 7520 30.6 107.2 0.016 1,311
CO2 emissions (kt) 7520 112985 455239 -80 6977011
GDP per capita 7520 5243 8441 62 72674
CO2 per capita 7520 3.7 5.9 -0.019 94.1
Number of 7520 3 5 0 30
atmosphere MEAs
I apply per capita values of GDP and CO2 emissions for the econometric model. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 display the relationship of these variables, visualizing the ﬁndings of the inverted
U-shaped Environmental Kuznets Curve – i.e., at ﬁrst ascending and then decreasing
CO2 emissions with increasing GDP per capita – using the example of six representative
countries. In ﬁgure 3.1 India represents a developing country with low GDP per capita
and thus rising per capita CO2 emissions with increasing GDP per capita. South Korea, a
former developing country, displays a still rising but upward sloping graph which is typical
for countries that have been shortly considered as developed. Israel also shows an upward
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sloping graph, but at a certain GDP per capita value (near 19500 dollars) CO2 emissions
start to fall. Same for Germany, with a peak at around 15000 dollars. Great Britain’s peak
is even at less than 15000 dollars, but the graph is very volatile. And the United States’
per capita CO2 emissions decrease after around 19500 dollars GDP per capita, like Israel.
In ﬁgure 3.2 all countries are plotted in one graph to underline the stimulus threshold
of around 19500 dollars per capita and the clear Environmental Kuznets Curve relation
between per capita values of CO2 emissions and GDP.
Figure 3.1: Representative countries in diﬀerent stadiums of the Environmental Kuznets
Curve
For the projection approaches in section 3.4 I apply world average annual growth rates
for GDP and population from the IPCC emission scenarios IS92 dataset version 1.1 (see
Pepper, Xing, Chen, and Moss, 1992). These numbers are to ﬁnd in table 3.3 in section
3.4. Unfortunately I cannot apply more recent data from the IPCC Special Report on
Emission Scenarios (SRES), because there GDP values are accounted as market exchange
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Figure 3.2: Level speciﬁc relationship of per capita CO2 emissions and per capita GDP
rates (mex) instead of constant US$ 2. But in ﬁgure 17 of the IPCC Third Assessment
Report (TAR), Climate Change 2001, Working Group I, The Scientiﬁc Basis, the very
similar trend of CO2 emissions of the A1B scenario based on data from the IPCC Special
Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) and the ones of IS92 are clearly to see (see ﬁgure
3.A.1). Moreover, applying IS92 data my main purpose of this chapter does not suﬀer
any lack of information, as I do not want to reveal another CO2 emissions forecast like
many other researchers before me. What I want to do, is to set CO2 emissions forecasts
in relation to forecasts that account for impacts of multilateral environmental agreements
on CO2 emissions. And with the IPCC IS92 data I can ﬁlter out very plastically the
beneﬁcial impact of the number of atmosphere MEAs by comparing my results with the
ones of Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) which are also based on growth rates from
IPCC IS92.
2cf. IPCC Data Distribution Centre at http://www.ipcc-data.org/
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As disappointing as I described the outcome of the 15th UN Climate Change Conference
in Copenhagen in my introduction, yet it was not. The participants were able to reach a
compromise – The Copenhagen Accord (see UNFCCC, 2009) – representing the intention
to keep global temperature rises to less than +2∘C. This temperature rise until 2050 can be
complied with the IPCC A1B scenario (see IPCC SRES, 2000; IPCC TAR, 2001; Pepper,
Xing, Chen, and Moss, 1992) which represents a balanced energy mix across all sources, a
mid-range increase in CO2 emissions until 2050, and decreasing CO2 emissions after 2050.
In my opinion, this is a very realistic and plausible scenario for the future - at least for
the years until 2050. My projection results in section 3.5 bring the +2∘C goal of The
Copenhagen Accord face to face to global achievements with multilateral environmental
agreements classiﬁed with atmosphere. But before I start with statistical impacts of at-
mosphere MEAs on CO2 emissions I want to give an introduction to the most important
Pros and Cons of MEAs, summarized in a SWOT analysis in ﬁgure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: SWOT analysis of multilateral environmental agreements
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A big advantage of MEAs is their multilateral and voluntary character. To save sovereignty
of all countries inside a MEA voluntariness is indispensable. And as environmental concerns
do not stop at a country’s border joint actions in a multilateral manner are a good way to
handle environmental protection. By means of the discussion and negotiation process in
the run-up to a MEA this form of global cooperation seems to be a very eﬃcient instru-
ment to allocate the participants’ rights and obligations as well as to increase worldwide
attention to global environmental aﬀairs with the associated preventive and precautionary
resource management. On the one hand these strengths oﬀer opportunities, but on the
other hand they contain threats which can result in weaknesses. For example the negoti-
ation process during the pre-agreement period indeed may bring about global consensus.
But to what extend this consensus means to comprise consequences arising out of deviating
from the agreement or guidances to resource management speciﬁc behavioral changes, is
often vague. Another ineﬀectiveness of MEAs may result from the voluntary character
and thus from free-rider advantages of not signing or ratifying a MEA (cf. the Kyoto
Protocol, which is not ratiﬁed by the USA). Numerous authors analyzed these strategic
aspects by use of game theoretic approaches (among many others see Barrett and Stavins,
2003; Barrett, 2001; Barrett, 1994; Bloch and Gomes, 2006; Buchholz, Haupt, and Peters,
2005; Caparro´s, Hammoudi, and Tazda¨ıt, 2004; Carraro, 1998; Carraro, Eyckmans, and
Finus, 2006; Carraro, Marchiori, and Sgobbi, 2005; Chander and Tulkens, 1992; Finus and
Rundshagen, 1998; Finus, van Ierland, and Dellink, 2006; Hoel, 1992; Hoel and Schneider,
1997). In my opinion, a material weakness of MEAs is that due to their voluntariness sharp
cuts in resource usage or high abatement costs cannot be written down in such agreements.
Costly or displeasingly environmental goals generate high incentives not to sign or to de-
viate from a MEA. This is especially the case for a potential post-Kyoto Protocol. This
means that only small steps can be carried through with single MEAs. Till this day the
eﬀect of a single MEA is diﬃcult to measure as there is no adequate performance index
that captures the diﬀerent mechanisms of MEAs. But in the medium or long run the
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sum of a range of MEAs may become equal to an important big step in environmental
protection. Coordination among diﬀerent MEAs is often a problem. On the one hand
coordination is important and it would be beneﬁcial to subsume diﬀerent environmental
issues in one MEA. But on the other hand it implies huge coordination eﬀorts with an
enormous demand for expertise in all diﬀerent environmental issue-areas the agreement
shall cover. In conjunction with inadequate funding this is often not achievable. But the
lack of synergy among diﬀerent MEAs does not stand in contrast to the opportunities of
worldwide sustainable use of natural resources that can be achieved with further eﬀorts in
single environmental disciplines. MEAs also support the development and standardization
of best practices and best strategies in environmental protection issues. And last but not
least the voluntary and multilateral character of MEAs for sure has the opportunity to
encourage green consciousness for present and future generations all over the world. Of
course this is true for MEAs in general as well as for MEAs classiﬁed with atmosphere, on
which I am focused in this chapter.
The map in ﬁgure 3.4 shows the worldwide distribution of the number of atmosphere MEAs
ratiﬁed until 2006. The number of atmosphere MEAs is separated into ﬁve quantiles: 0-
20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, and 80-100 quantiles. Hereby countries can be easily classed as
countries with the median number of atmosphere MEAs (yellow), countries with a low or
the lowest number of atmosphere MEAs (red and dark red), and countries with a high or
the highest number of atmosphere MEAs (green and dark green). For example Germany
and Luxembourg are dark green colored as they show the highest number of MEAs related
to atmosphere in 2006. The United States, Latvia, Cyprus, and Azerbaijan are also dark
green colored as they produce just enough MEAs to be in the top group. Interestingly the
typical black sheep in terms of emitting CO2 – the United States, Russia, and China – are
colored green or dark green. This fact seems to indicate a ﬁrst valid reason why hope in
more friendly developments of CO2 emission reductions in the future could be appropriate.
The high numbers of atmosphere MEAs state that these countries do not block global
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Figure 3.4: The number of atmosphere MEAs in 2006
cooperations in CO2 emission reductions to the extent negotiation diﬃculties of the Kyoto
Protocol would suggest, e.g., as the USA did not yet ratify that Protocol (cf. Mitchell,
2007).
3.3 Econometric model
According to the Environmental Kuznets Curve the level of GDP per capita matters in
terms of a country’s CO2 emission behavior. And according to the graphs in ﬁgure 3.1 and
3.2 countries show similar behavior inside a speciﬁc GDP per capita range. Hence countries
should be sampled into diﬀerent segments to ﬁlter out their segment speciﬁc impact on
per capita CO2 emissions. Analogous to Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) I apply a
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spline model with 10 segments. They show that the explanatory power of 10 or 12 segments
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from using 20 or 24 segments but much more convenient to
use. This segmentation is labeled by function 퐹 in the following regression equation:
푙푛 (푐푖푡) = 훼푖 + 훽푡 + 휂푠퐹 [푙푛(푦푖푡] + 휖푖푡, (3.1)
where 푐푖푡 denotes per capita CO2 emissions country 푖, 푖 = 1, ..., 푁 has emitted in year 푡,
푡 = 1, ..., 푇 . 훼푖 and 훽푡 represent the country-ﬁxed and year-ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. 푦푖푡 are
country speciﬁc and yearly values of GDP per capita, and 휂푠 speciﬁes the segment speciﬁc
parameter that is to be estimated. The error term is denoted by 휖푖푡. In order to be able
to compare results of this model with results of a model which additionally captures the
impact of MEAs related to atmosphere, I add 푥푖푡−1, representing the country speciﬁc and
yearly count of atmosphere MEAs lagged by one period, and the associated segment speciﬁc
paramter 휃푠 to equation (3.1). This lag makes sure that potential endogeneity – through
an contemporaneous impulse from 푦푖푡 on 푥푖푡 (see chapter 1 and 2) – can be excluded. I
also experimented with more than one lag, but results did not change signiﬁcantly3:
푙푛 (푐푖푡) = 훼푖 + 훽푡 + 휂푠퐹 [푙푛(푦푖푡)] + 휃푠퐹 [푥푖푡−1] + 휖푖푡 (3.2)
Results of equation (3.1) and (3.2) are to ﬁnd in table 3.2. Due to the log-log speciﬁcation
of per capita CO2 emissions and per capita GDP estimations results of 퐹 [푙푛(푦푖푡)] can be
directly interpreted as elasticities. The inverted U-shape of the Environmental Kuznets
Curve is quite clearly to see. Here it appears ﬁrst as a backslash followed by the classical
inverted U-shape: In the ﬁrst four segments the eﬀect of GDP per capita is falling from a
3Furthermore, estimation results can avert suspicion in endogeneity as coeﬃcients for 퐹 [푙푛(푦푖푡)] do not
change much (see table 3.2) if controlling additionally for the number MEAs classiﬁed with atmosphere.
This means with equation (3.2) I am able to ﬁlter the eﬀect of the number of atmosphere MEAs out of
the country-ﬁxed eﬀect.
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high value. Then it rises again up to the middle segments and – skipping the insigniﬁcant
impact of the 7푡ℎ segment – from segment 8 onwards the eﬀect is decreasing again. In the
10푡ℎ segment it is even well below zero and signiﬁcant. This is true for both equations.
According to GDP per capita values India is listed in segments 1 to 4 and Korea in segments
5 to 9 over the whole period between 1960 and 2006. Thus, they can serve pretty well as
examples of the two decreasing trends I described above. And as countries like the United
States, Germany, France, and Great Britain are part of the 10푡ℎ segment, the negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect of this segment becomes plausible having a look at the decreasing CO2 per
capita values with increasing GDP per capita of these countries in ﬁgure 3.1 and ﬁgure 3.2.
MEAs related to atmosphere display a signiﬁcant impact on the CO2 emissions per capita
in all segments, and as a sign of eﬀectiveness their direction is always negative. Another
insight which can be derived from table 3.2 is that with rising segment number the impact
of the number of atmosphere MEAs decreases. Unfortunately this does not explain where
the declining impact of multilateral environmental agreements at rising GDP per capita
stems from. But it may represent the relatively higher eﬀect in reducing CO2 emissions by
countries with relatively lower GDP per capita values, as these countries have a relatively
higher marginal product in CO2 emission reduction (or lower marginal abatement costs)
than richer countries that already invest much in CO2 emission reduction. This fact is
backed by the objectives of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with which CO2
emission reductions of developed countries can be fulﬁlled in developing countries. Hereby
abatement cost saving opportunities can be achieved and the corresponding reduction eﬀort
can be used partly to meet the Kyoto Protocol reduction targets of the developed country4.
4cf. The Marrakesh Accords, 2001
Chapter 3 – Multilateral Environmental Agreements in 2050:
Are They Sustainable Enough?
97
Table 3.2: Estimation results of GDP per capita and the number of atmosphere MEAs
Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2)
Seg- GDP range GDP GDP Number of atmo-
ments (2000 US$) per capita per capita sphere MEAs
(1) 62 - 215 2.3307∗∗∗ 2.4257∗∗∗ -0.6461∗∗∗
(2) 215 - 343 0.7762∗∗∗ 0.7669∗∗∗ 0.0139
(3) 343 - 574 -0.0516 -0.0513 -0.2806∗∗∗
(4) 574 - 928 -0.0420 -0.0496∗ -0.1457∗∗∗
(5) 928 - 1452 1.1769∗∗∗ 1.0406∗∗∗ -0.1610∗∗∗
(6) 1452 - 2250 1.2892∗∗∗ 1.0559∗∗ -0.1439∗∗∗
(7) 2250 - 4231 -0.6268 -0.5618 -0.0887∗
(8) 4231 - 8751 0.5938∗∗∗ 0.5313∗∗∗ -0.0438∗∗∗
(9) 8751 - 17084 0.1846∗ 0.2995∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗
(10) 17084 - 72674 -0.5199∗∗∗ -0.4142∗∗∗ -0.0143
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates that parameters are signiﬁcant at 5%, 1%, and
0.1%, respectively. There are 160 countries and 7,520 observations, or more
speciﬁcally, 752 observations per segment. Parameters are estimated over the
period 1960-2006.
3.4 Projection approach
As forecast models are invented primarily to forecast values one-step ahead and as they
loose forecasting power very rapidly by trying to forecast 12 steps ahead or more, I use
IPCC projections for population and GDP for the years between 2006 and 2050 from IPCC
IS92 (cf. Pepper, Xing, Chen, and Moss (1992)), analogous to Schmalensee, Stoker, and
Judson (1998), summarized in table 3.3. Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) stated
in their paper that a “serious question is whether [...] per-capita income is likely to be
the same in the future as in the recent past, since future decisions in all nations will be
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made with diﬀerent technologies and environmental information than past decisions” (p.
20, footnote 21). Because they employed measured data until 1990 and because after 1990
until 2006 countries’ activities related to multilateral environmental agreements accelerated
enormously, the very fact of data availability of the latest two decades gives new ﬁndings
and solves their claim to some extend. With my approach of ﬁltering out the impact of
the number of atmosphere MEAs I am able to give additional insights into future CO2
emission reduction eﬀorts in the world by means of environmental agreements.
Table 3.3: IPCC A1B scenario projections of GDP and population
Average annual GDP Population
growth rates
2006-2025 2.86 1.35
2025-2050 2.10 0.70
To complete the projection approach or rather to extrapolate the remaining two parameters
– the year-ﬁxed eﬀects and the number of atmosphere MEAs – I make use of a linear and
a nonlinear method like Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998). With these two methods
I try to capture a plausible corridor of the parameters.
The linear approach is a linear spline model with two growth rates for the periods before
and after 1980 (superscript l indicating linear). 푡 contains the years, 1[푡 ≥ 1980] represents
a dummy which is zero for the years before 1980, and 훾, 훿, and 휅 are to be estimated:
훽푙푡 = 훾
푙 + 훿푙푡+ 휅푙(푡− 1980) ⋅ 1[푡 ≥ 1980] (3.3)
푥푙푖푡 = 훾
푙
푖 + 훿
푙
푖푡+ 휅
푙
푖(푡− 1980) ⋅ 1[푡 ≥ 1980] (3.4)
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From a statistical viewpoint, 1980 symbolizes the start of a growing impact of the number
of atmosphere MEAs on the regression results. In ﬁgure 3.5 both graphs of the year-ﬁxed
eﬀects run parallel before 1980. But afterwards the regression that accounts for the number
of atmosphere MEAs has a higher gradient. Thus, I try to capture this point of separation
with a diﬀerent trend for the years after 1980.
The nonlinear method (with superscript nl) aims to cover the upward sloping trend of the
year-ﬁxed eﬀects over the whole course of time. Here a logarithmic function comes very
close to the real trend. In distinction to the linear approach all years of the dataset are
taken into account:
훽푛푙푡 = 훾
푛푙 + 훿푛푙푡+ 휅푛푙푙푛(푡− 1950) (3.5)
푥푛푙푖푡 = 훾
푛푙
푖 + 훿
푛푙
푖 푡+ 휅
푛푙
푖 푙푛(푡− 1950) (3.6)
For the linear and nonlinear projection approach of the year-ﬁxed eﬀects (equations (3.3)
and (3.5)) I need to exclude the years after 2001. In ﬁgure 3.5 the sharp decline in the
year-ﬁxed eﬀects in 2001, representing the impacts of 10/11, is clearly to see. If I had used
the years 2002 to 2006 for the projection, I would have projected only further declining
year-ﬁxed eﬀects after 2006 and for all following years. As this drop is still predominant
in the last year of my sample, it outweighs the actually upward sloping trend of the whole
sample and thus leads to incorrect and undersized projections. This is particularly serious
for the nonlinear projection approach. Due to this, without loss of generality I use only
the years 1960 to 2001 for the year-ﬁxed eﬀects projections.
Similar to the year-ﬁxed eﬀects I project the number of atmosphere MEAs linearly as well
as nonlinearly applying equations (3.4) and (3.6). Projection results open a corridor of a
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Figure 3.5: Year-ﬁxed eﬀects between 1960 and 2006
Figure 3.6: Year-ﬁxed eﬀects projections until 2050
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world average number of 25 to 29 atmosphere MEAs in 2050 (see ﬁgure 3.7), i.e., nearly as
many atmosphere MEAs as Germany or Luxembourg already have in 2006. In my opinion,
this is a plausible future scenario of a realistic average number of atmosphere MEAs in
the world. Between 1980 and 2006, e.g., Germany and Luxembourg raised their number of
atmosphere MEAs from 4 and 5 to 30. In other words, they increased sixfold their number
of atmosphere MEAs within 26 years. Thus, it should be plausible to assume the world
average number of MEAs to raise from 9 (in 2006) to 25 or 29 (in 2050). This means, on
average the number of atmosphere MEAs in the world only needs to be tripled until 2050,
and there are nearly double as many years to fulﬁll the triplication than Germany and
Luxembourg had.
Figure 3.7: World average number of atmosphere MEAs between 1960 and 2050
Chapter 3 – Multilateral Environmental Agreements in 2050:
Are They Sustainable Enough?
102
3.5 Results
Employing the projections of GDP and Population, which are based on IPCC A1B scenario
growth rates, and the linearly and nonlinearly projected year-ﬁxed eﬀects and number of
atmosphere MEAs, applying spline models, I can now compute the corresponding CO2
emissions until 2050.
Figure 3.8: Carbon dioxide emission projections
In ﬁgure 3.8 you ﬁnd one benchmark curve of the IPCC A1B scenario, two curves represent-
ing the 10-segment spline model results with linear and nonlinear projection approaches
of the year-ﬁxed eﬀects, and four curves based on diﬀerent combinations of linear and
nonlinear projections of the year-ﬁxed eﬀects and the number of atmosphere MEAs. For
an easier identiﬁcation of the curves I use short dashes for CO2 emissions results based on
linear projections of year-ﬁxed eﬀects and long dashes for results with nonlinear projected
year-ﬁxed eﬀects. One dot separating the dashes indicates additionally linear projected
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atmosphere MEAs. And two dots separating the dashes symbolize results of an underlying
nonlinear projection approach of the number of atmosphere MEAs. The two curves that
do not consider the number of atmosphere MEAs (short dashes and long dashes without
dots) are very similar to the results of Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998). Here CO2
emissions double or nearly triple, compared to emissions in 2006, reaching an index value
of 222 and 289, respectively5. But taking into account the growing number of multilateral
environmental agreements related to atmosphere, CO2 emissions projection results can be
reduced quite a lot (cf. red curves vs. blue curves in ﬁgure 3.8). By introducing linearly
projected atmosphere MEAs corresponding CO2 emissions projections can be reduced by
86 index points, i.e., 29.8% in 2050 (short-dash curve vs. short-dash-dot curve) or by 60
index points and 27.0% (long-dash curve vs. long-dash-dot curve), respectively. With the
latter setting CO2 emissions projections can actually undercut the IPCC A1B scenario
projections. And assuming both nonlinear projected year-ﬁxed eﬀects and atmosphere
MEAs, results can fall short even further. More precisely, here CO2 emissions projections
are 26 index points or 15.3% lower than the IPCC A1B scenario projections in 2050. In
relation to the curve that does not account for atmosphere MEAs (but also contains non-
linear projected year-ﬁxed eﬀects) this impact actually equals 78 index points or 35.1% less
CO2 emissions in 2050. This means, the moderate accelerating number of MEAs classiﬁed
with atmosphere (cf. atmosphere MEAs projections in section 3.4) intensiﬁes its impact
on CO2 emissions over time to the extent that emissions can be reduced by up to 35.1% or
even 37.4% in 2050 relative to projections not considering atmosphere related multilateral
5 In fruitful discussions with Maximilian Auﬀhammer during his stay at the Ifo Institute for Economic
Research at the Univerity of Munich I learned about another model setting which probably predicts
the total level of CO2 emissions more precisely. In a forthcoming paper Aufhammer and Steinhauser
(2010) show that their new model setting of a slightly changed composition of a reduced form model can
outperform a littel the one of Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) on the basis of U.S. CO2 emissions
data at the state level. But in a performance test between their best model and the ones of Holtz-Eakin and
Selden (1995), Yang and Schneider (1998), and Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) the “Schmalensee
et al. (1998) predictions lie closest to the best model among the three” (Auﬀhammer and Steinhauser,
2010, p.17). In addition, as I compute the diﬀerences of CO2 emissions projections between equations
(3.1) and (3.2) this slight lack in accuracy does not harm my relative eﬀects.
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environmental agreements. These values represent comparisons that can be drawn from
the two scenarios based on nonlinear projected year-ﬁxed eﬀects and the two scenarios
assuming linear projected year-ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. Interestingly all four settings
that account for the impact of a growing number of atmosphere MEAs are located around
the IPCC A1B scenario. Thus, they open a corridor in which it seems to be possible to
fulﬁll the +2∘C goal of the Copenhagen Accord with the aid of small but continuous steps
achieved with atmosphere related multilateral environmental agreements.
3.6 Conclusion
Multilateral environmental agreements in general and multilateral environmental agree-
ments classiﬁed with atmosphere in particular are a good tool to bring the world or at
least more than two countries to a round table to discuss about climate change and other
atmosphere related topics, and to decide the participants’ aﬀords optimizing it. Till this
day they represent the one and only way to come to a global agreement about global warm-
ing. This eﬀort can be attributed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) or more speciﬁcally to the Kyoto Protocol. Analyzing the quantitative
eﬀects of atmosphere MEAs on the ﬁght against climate change, i.e. reducing CO2 emis-
sions, yields to a optimistic view. There is a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect of atmosphere
MEAs on CO2 emissions, and they can bring about enough sustainable development to
succeed a temperature rise less than +2∘C until 2050.
This leads me to the conclusion that current and future atmosphere MEAs on its own are
suﬃcient in stopping climate change. My results can grant them a sustainable impulse
in global warming eﬀorts. Green thinking of many countries’ politicians and a growing
eco-friendly consciousness may embody the foundation of further necessary measures (like
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CO2 certiﬁcate trading or carbon tax policies) in order to limit CO2 emissions even more
eﬀectively. But atmosphere MEAs seem to cope it or at least seem to make a major
contribution to reasonable CO2 emissions reductions until 2050.
“How do you feel about [multilateral environmental agreements]?
Tell me, pray.
You are a dear, good-hearted man,
But I believe you’ve little good of it to say.”
(J. W. von Goethe, Faust, 1808, p. 226)
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Appendix - Chapter 3
3.A.1 CO2 emissions of the IPCC A1B scenario
Figure 3.A.1: IPCC SRES scenarios
This is ﬁgure 17 of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), Climate Change 2001,
Working Group I, The Scientiﬁc Basis (see IPCC TAR, 2001; downloadable at http://
www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/). In the upper left box the very similar
trend of CO2 emissions of the A1B scenario, based on data from the IPCC Special Report
on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (see IPCC SRES, 2000), and the emissions of the IS92 (see
Pepper, W. J., X. Xing, R. S. Chen, and R. H. Moss, 1992) is clearly to see.
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